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INTRODUCTION

For the millions of citizens who file Social Security disability
claims each year,' the last concern should be whether their claims will
t B.A., International Studies and Political Science, Texas A&M University, 2000; candidate for J.D., Cornell Law School, 2005. I would like to thank Judge David G. Latimer
and Kathryn Lee of the United States District Court for the Western District of Ncw York
for their assistance in obtaining copies of various documents filed in the Pronti case. This
Note also benefited from the helpful guidance of Professor Cynthia R. Farina, and I thank
her as well. Finally, I extend a sincere "thank you" to Jason B. Tompkins and Benjamin
Rosenblum for going beyond the duties of friendship, graciously giving their valuable time
and invaluable suggestions. This process-and the last three years-would not have been
as enjoyable without them.
1
See SOCIAL SECURITY ADvIsoRY BOARD, DISABILITY DECISION MAKING: DATA AND
MATERIALS, chart 1 (Jan. 2001) [hereinafter SOCIAL SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD] (showing
approximately 1.5 million SSDI and 1.2 million SSI claims filed in calendar year 1999),
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be fairly adjudicated. Indeed, if discretion-removing rules were the
key to fairness, 2 then a single look at the multitude of regulations governing Social Security disability claims would allay any such fear.3 But
claimants would be falsely placated. Despite the effort to make Social
Security disability determinations mechanical, human administrators
have ample opportunity to wield discretion-and introduce bias.
This fact is especially true for the significant number of claimants
whose applications are examined by an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ). ALJs regularly must exercise discretion when interpreting
reams of medical evidence and making innumerable credibility determinations. 4 But an unfortunate and unavoidable side-effect of this
discretion is the opportunity for lawless decisionmaking. 5 Even
though the regulations provide ALJs with standards by which to evaluate claims, few will deny that bias inevitably seeps into their decisionmaking process.
With some ALJs, however, bias more than seeps. It gushes. From
racial, gender, and class prejudice to bias against disability claimants
in general, ALJs might possess-and exhibit in their decisions-any
viewpoint extant in the world. In some cases, the manifestations of
such biases would dismay even the most ardent advocates of judicial
discretion, prompting the question of how to remedy such bias. And
in such a case, an aggrieved Social Security disability claimant may be
greatly disappointed as his lawyers are confronted with a procedural
and evidentiary nightmare.
Though the true extent of the general bias of Social Security Administration ALJs is unknowable, Part I of this Note introduces the
concept of general bias and presents two extreme cases demonstrating
the concept. Part II analyzes the deficiencies of the present system in
addressing ALJ general bias, including the lack of adequate agency
process, an inability to present the evidence necessary to prove a claim
of bias, and the restrictions on reviewability in the federal courts. This
Part demonstrates the need for a valid and effective means of addressing the problem of general bias. Part III suggests two yet-unexplored
available at http://www.ssab.gov/NEW/Publications/Disability/chartbookA.pdf, http://
www.ssab.gov/NEW/Publications/Disability/chartbookB.pdf (last visited Jan 8, 2005).
2
SeeAntonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHi. L. REV. 1175, 1178
(1989) ("The trouble with the discretion-conferring approach tojudicial law making is that
it does not satisfy this sense of justice very well."); see also Holmes v. New York City Hous.
Auth., 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968) ("It hardly need be said that the existence of an
absolute and uncontrolled discretion in an agency of government vested with the administration of a vast program . . .would be an intolerable invitation to abuse.").
3 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1501 et seq., 416.901 et seq (2004).
4 See, e.g., id. §§ 404.1527, 416.927 (discussing how opinion evidence is evaluated); id.
§§ 404.1529, 416.929 (informing claimants how symptoms are evaluated).
5 See Scalia, supra note 2, at 1179-80 ("Only by announcing rules do we hedge
[judges] in.").
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methods: Bivens actions and writs of mandamus. Though uncertain
and largely untested, these methods are presently available to Social
Security disability claimants, without the need for modification of existing statutes or governing regulations.
I
GENERAL BIAS AND SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS

A.

"Bias" Defined

The right to be heard by a fair and impartial adjudicator has long
6
been considered a fundamental right in American courts. Adminis7
Although
trative agencies are likewise -bound by the principle.
agency decisionmakers need not be impartial in every decision they
make, agency adjudication normally cannot be, or appear to be, partial to one party.8
Bias can take more than one form, and it is worth clarifying the
9
focus here before much more ink is spilt. Most litigated cases involv6 See, e.g., Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 216 (1971) ("Trial before an 'unbiased judge' is essential to due process."). This right is perhaps the only one that no one
would argue is not enshrined in the Due Process Clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No
person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ....);
see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating that no state shall do the same); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) ("A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due
process."). Courts have little trouble finding deep-rooted support for this proposition in
English law. See, e.g., Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523-26 (1927) (exploring England's
procedures for ensuring that adjudicators had no pecuniary interest in the cases they decided); Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler, 110 U.S. 347, 364 (1884) ("It need hardly
be said that it is an elementary principle of naturaljustice that no man shall sit injudgment
where he is interested, no matter how unimpeachable his personal integrity" (citing City of
London v. Wood, 12 Modern 669 (K.B. 1701))). See generally 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA &
JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CoNsTiTuTiONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 17.8, at
100 (3d ed. 1999) (noting that fairness, as embodied by a neutral decisionmaker, is contained in the Due Process Clause).
7 Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46-47 (1975) (holding that the notion of a fair trial
"applies to administrative agencies which adjudicate as well as to courts"); see also Gibson v.
Barryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973) (noting that much of the law on disqualification due to
interest applies equally to administrative adjudications); Hummel v. Heckler, 736 F.2d 91,
93 (3d Cir. 1984) ("Indeed, the absence in the administrative process of procedural safeguards normally available in judicial proceedings has been recognized as a reason for even
stricterapplication of the requirement that administrative adjudicators be impartial." (emphasis added)).
8 For an overview of the distinction between legislative and adjudicatory facts and the
role the distinction plays in determining the acceptability of agency bias, see Bernard
Schwartz, A Decade of Administrative Law: 1987-1996, 32 TULSA L.J. 493, 530-35 (1997).
9

Authors have various methods of classifying bias. See, e.g., ROBERT D. KLIcGMAN, BIAs

(1998) (dividing bias into six groups: personal relational bias, non-personal relational bias,
informational bias, attitudinal bias, institutional bias, and operational bias); ANAND SWARUP
MisRA, THE LAW OF BIAs AND MALA FLOES 24-35 (1970) (detailing three categories: judging
one's own cause, pecuniary interest, and non-pecuniary interest). This Note defines just
two categories of bias: specific and general. Both Kligman's and Misra's categories can be
reduced into these two categories. See infra notes 11, 13.
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ing bias concern instances in which the adjudicator has an interest in
the outcome of the particular case before him, whether it be monetary or personal.' 0 This Note labels this type of bias "specific bias.""
A second form of bias, commonly referred to as "prejudice," is a general predisposition on the part of the adjudicator, however formed or
instigated, to decide certain issues in certain ways. t 2 This Note labels
this type of bias "general bias."' 3 General bias can take legitimate
forms (like a preference for textualism) or unacceptable forms (such
as racial animus).14 The major difference between specific and general bias is the focus: while specific bias is party- or case-oriented, general bias is issue-oriented. 15
Significantly, the evidence needed to prove general bias is quite
different from that needed to prove specific.1 6 With specific bias, evidence particular to a case (such as business arrangements, family relationships, or prior history between the parties) is the most relevant in
proving that such bias exists. The facts establishing a specific bias either exist or they do not: the judge either is or is not the claimant's
10 See, e.g., Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523-35 (proscribing a system in which the adjudicator
was remunerated only for convictions); Spring Valley Water Works, 110 U.S. at 364 (Fields, J.,
dissenting) (describing Wood, 12 Modern at 669, which proscribed London's mayor and
aldermen from holding court in judgment of a case in which the mayor and the city were
parties); see also R.D.S. STEVENS, BIAS AND IMPARTIALITY IN MAGISTRATES' COURTS 3-32
(1982) (dividing bias into four categories, each of which can be fit into this definition).
11
See Meiring de Villiers, Technological Risk and issue Preclusion:A Legal and Policy Critique, 9 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 523, 532-33 (2000). Kligman's categories of personal
relational bias, non-personal relational bias, and informational bias can all be considered
forms of "specific" bias, as defined here. See KLIGMAN, supra note 9, at 1-26. Misra's categories of judging one's own cause and pecuniary interest are also forms of "specific" bias.
See MISRA, supra note 9, at 24-30.
12

See WEBSTER'S

THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICIONARY (UNABRIDGED)

1788 (1986)

(defining "prejudice" as a "preconceived judgment or opinion").
13
de Villiers, supra note 11, at 532-33. Kligman's category of "attitudinal bias" fits
within the definition of "general" bias. See KLIGMAN, supra note 9, at 27-31. Likewise,
Misra's category of "non-pecuniary interest" is analogous to "general bias." See MIsRA, supra
note 9, at 30-35.
14
See de Villiers, supra note 11, at 532-33. Legitimate and acceptable forms of general bias are probably more accurately denominated as "persuasions." The "general biases"
this Note seeks to remedy are only those properly considered "unacceptable."
15
See id.; see also Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775-80 (2002) (cataloguing
the possible meanings of "impartiality" in a canon ofjudicial conduct); Mark Cammack, In
Search of the Post-PositivistJury, 70 IND. L.J. 405, 433-34 (1995) (noting the difficulty and
disadvantages of trying to obtain a "blank slate"jury free of general bias); Meiring de Villiers, A Legal and Policy Analysis of Bifurcated Litigation, 2000 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 153,
166-68 (discussing general and specific bias as it applies to the requirement of an impartial jury). See generally Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: Representation of Groups on Petit
Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715 (1977) (arguing for a system of peremptory challenges that would
enable parties to discharge potential jurors with specific biases without eliminating jurors
on the basis of general bias).
16 The most salient examples of how courts treat bias come from equal protection
cases. See, e.g., infra cases cited note 18. The evidentiary issues discussed here and supported in those cases, however, are readily applicable to proving bias in all contexts.
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brother; the judge either does or does not have a financial interest in
the outcome of the case. This sort of evidence is usually contained in
the record of a single case; testimony can be heard and documents
can be submitted which prove the circumstances of a given relation17
ship and, thus, lead to a conclusion that the adjudicator is biased.
On the other hand, the evidence in the record of a single case
rarely proves general bias.' 8 Because general bias involves prejudgment, proving it from the record of a single case requires statements
or overt actions on the part of the adjudicator that shed light on his
internal decisionmaking. 19 Unless an adjudicator is reckless with his
words or actions, such evidence is rarely available. A more practical
method of proof is by examining multiple decisions 2 0-either statisti22
2
Using this sort of analycally ' or in some other systematic manner.
sis, one can "control for" legitimate factors that may animate the

adjudicator's decisions (such as claimant age or health) and thereby
establish whether a general bias is in fact significantly contributing to

(if not actually determining) an adjudicator's decisions.2 3

17
See generally KLIGMAN, supra note 9, at 1-26 (giving examples of specific bias, each
depending on such things for proof as personal or business relationships and prior involvement in the case).
18
See, e.g., Lovellette v. Barnhart, No. 1:02-CV-278, 2003 WL 21918642, at *13-14
(N.D. Ind. June 25, 2003) ("[R]ulings alone are almost never sufficient evidence of bias."
(citing Litekyv. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994); Marozsan v. United States, 90 F.3d
1284, 1290 (7th Cir. 1996))). But see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92-97 (1986) (indicating that the removal of African-American jurors in a particular venire or a prosecutors'
statements and questions may support a claim of general bias in some cases).
19 See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555 ("J]udicial remarks during the course of a trial that are
critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, . . . will
[support a bias challenge] if they reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as
to make fair judgment impossible."); Miller v. Poretsky, 595 F.2d 780, 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(Robinson, J. concurring) ("Absent something amounting well nigh to an open admission
of discriminatory purpose, victims may find it virtually impossible to prove that fact unless
permitted to introduce evidence that the defendant has engaged in one or more acts of
discrimination against others.").
20
See generally KLiGMAN, supra note 9, at 27-31 (citing cases of general bias, proof of
which is mustered only after considering many cases).
21
See, e.g., McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292-97 (1987) (detailing a statistical study
used in an attempt to prove that administration of the death penalty was biased against
African Americans).
See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)
22
(allowing the use of "pattern" evidence to prove discriminatory intent).
23
See id. at 266 ("Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race,
emerges from the effect of the state action . . . ." (emphasis added)). Although it is certainly true that "correlation is not causation," statistical evidence is quite useful in proving
what is not causing a certain result. Thus, if one were to control for variables such as
claimant age and health, one might eliminate the possibility that such legitimate variables
explain differences in approval rates among ALJs. The only explanation remaining would
be general bias. The difficult task would be to discern whether it is simplyjudicial persuasion, see supra note 14, that explains differences among judges. Perhaps one could compare the approval rate of an ALJ accused of bias against judges of known philosophies to
determine whether the rates are similar. Regardless, judicial persuasion should play a
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Like most bias cases in other contexts, biases in Social Security
disability cases typically are of the "specific" type. 24 This Note, however, focuses on instances of general bias-specifically, bias against
claimants as a whole. 25 It will explore how, if at all, a claimant can
confront and remedy such general bias by working within the framework of the Social Security Act, the Commissioner's regulations, and
6
the federal courts.2
small role in ALJ decisions; the Social Security disability guidelines are fairly mechanical
and, therefore, do not provide the opportunities forjudicial persuasions to manifest themselves significantly. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
24
See, e.g., Aden v. Barnhart, No. 01 Civ. 5170(LAK), 2003 WIL 21361723, at *2-3
(S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2003); Shepard v. Massanari, No. Civ.A.01-0953, 2002 WIL 31190917, at
*8 (E.D. La. Aug. 15, 2002); Lowry v. Massanari, No. CV-99-1210-ST, 2001 "AL 34047027, at
*1 (D. Or. Apr. 5, 2001); Epherson v. Apfel, No. CIV.A.99-1761, 2000 WL 341024, at *8
(E.D. La. Mar. 30, 2000); Lowe v. Apfel, No. C 98-3972 SC., 1999 AL 447597, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. June 28, 1999).
25
See, e.g., Pronti v. Barnhart, 339 F. Supp. 2d 480 (W.D.N.Y. 2004) (alleging general
bias against Social Security disability claimant); Myles v. Apfel, No. 95 C 3929, 1998 WL
473940, at *6 (N.D. Il1. Aug. 3, 1998) (same); Pastrana v. Chater, 917 F. Supp. 103, 107
(D.P.R. 1996) (same); Small v. Sullivan, 820 F. Supp. 1098, 1108 (S.D. I11.1992) (same);
Kendrick v. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. 94, 97-103 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (same); Grant v. Sullivan,
720 F. Supp. 462, 463-64 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (same), rev'd sub nom. Grant v. Shalala, 989 F,2d
1332 (3d Cir. 1993), remanded sub nom. to Grant v. Comm'r, 111 F. Supp. 2d 556 (M.D. Pa.
2000). The nature of the general bias in these particular cases is characterized as a bias
against Social Security claimants as a whole. Though it has been argued that what may be
exhibited in cases such as these is truly race-, gender-, or even class-based bias, see Elaine
Golin, Note, Solving the Problem of Gender and Racial Bias in Administrative Adjudication, 95
COLUM. L. REv. 1532, 1544-51 (1995), this Note accepts the biased comments as having
their facial meaning. This removes equal protection issues from the table and allows the
discussion to focus squarely on the inadequacy of the remedies for general ALJ bias in the
Social Security disability context.
26
One plausibly could contend that the issue of general bias is not cause for concern.
After all, many judges (if not most) probably have certain decisional tendencies, such as
being pro-big business, anti-tobacco, or pro-criminal defendant. Judges are allowed and
expected to have-if not specifically nominated or elected for having-those biases. See
Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 778-79 (2002). One might make -an even
stronger case that agencies should be allowed to exhibit certain administration-encouraged
general biases. See FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 700-03 (1948). Agency general
biases, however, are usually tolerated more in rulemaking procedures than adjudicatory
ones. See Schwartz, supra note 8, at 531. Social Security benefits proceedings are adjudicatory actions and thus necessitate a lower tolerance for bias. See id. And despite the modern
push by ALJs to make themselves perceived and treated more like Article III judges who
presumably are free to have some general biases, see Golin, supra note 25, at 1536-43, ALJs
are not Article III judges and should not receive equivalent leeway. See Ventura v. Shalala,
55 F.3d 900, 902 (3d Cir. 1995) ("The due process requirement of an impartial decisionmaker is applied more strictly in administrative proceedings than in court proceedings
because of the absence of procedural safeguards normally available in judicial proceedings." (emphasis added)). Furthermore, even if the permissible amount of ALJ bias is
equivalent to that of Article III judges, one would expect that even Article III judges exhibiting the types of general bias this Note focuses on, see supra note 23; infra Part I.C, would
incur some form of remedial action. See ABA COnE OFJUDICAL Connucr, Canon 3(B) (5)

(1990) (
Ajudge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. Ajudge shall
not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest
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27

For a claimant to receive Social Security benefits, 28 the individual
29
must first file an application with the Social Security Administration.
The Administration then makes an initial determination on the merits
of the individual's claim. 30 If the claimant's application is denied, he
may request that the Social Security Administration reconsider its initial determination under the same staff review process used initially. 31
Upon an unfavorable decision at reconsideration, the claimant can
request a hearing before an ALJ32 who will, after collecting the necessary evidence and holding a hearing, decide (using specific guidelines) whether the claimant is entitled to benefits. 33
A claimant who is still dissatisfied with the ALJ's disability determination can appeal the decision to the Appeals Council of the Social
Security Administration. 34 The Appeals Council has the ability to decline review3 5 or, upon review, affirm, reverse, or modify the decision
of the ALJ.3 6 At this point, the ruling becomes the final decision of
the Commissioner. Claimants still faced with an adverse decision after
their multiple appeals at the agency level may appeal the final decibias or prejudice, including but not limited to bias or prejudice based upon
race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status ....
(emphasis added)).
27
The inuicacies of this process and these regulations as they specifically relate to the
issue of ALJ general bias will be explored fully in Part II. For now it is enough only
superficially to understand the "life" of a Social Security benefits claim. For a rather
complex, but thorough, depiction of the entire claims process, see the Social Security
Administration Online, How of Cases Through the Disability Process, at http://www.ssa.gov/
disability/disability-processframeset.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2005).
28 For purposes of this Note, the term "Social Security benefits" refers to those payments made under both Titles 11and XVI of the Social Security Act. Pub L. No. 74-271, 49
Stat. 620 (1935) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., 1381 et seq. (2000)). Title II benefits
are commonly known as Social Security Disability Insurance benefits (SSDI), and Title XVI
benefits are commonly known as Supplemental Security Income (SSI). The definition of
"disability" is the same for both types of benefits: the "inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for
a continuous period of not less than 12 months." Id. § 423(d) (1) (A). Likewise, the Code
of Federal Regulations applies identical requirements for proof of disability under both
Titles. Compare 20 C.F.R. § 404.1501 et seq, (2004) (regulations for determining disability
for SSDI benefits), with id. § 416.901 et seq. (regulations for determining disability for SSI
benefits).
29
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.603 (2004).
30
See id. § 404.902-06.
31
See id. § 404.907-22.
32
See id. § 404.929-43.
33 See id. §§ 404.944-61, 404.1501-99, 416.901-98.
34
See id. § 404.966-67.
35 For the criteria the Appeals Council uses to decide whether to hear an appeal, see
id. § 404.970.
36
Id. § 404.979.
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sion of the Commissioner to the federal court in the district in which
the claimant resides.3 7 There, the court must affirm the ALJ's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence contained in the administrative record.3 8 The court may not conduct its own hearing or
discovery;39 it is limited to the record evidence filed with the Commis40
sioner's answer to a claimant's complaint.
As the previous outline demonstrates, ALJs play an undeniably
significant role in the Social Security disability claim process. In fiscal
year 2000, nearly 2,000,000 applications for Social Security Disability
Insurance and Supplemental Security Income benefits were reviewed
by the Social Security Administration. 41 Fully 62% of applications
were denied at the initial determination. 42 Thirty-five percent of
those initially denied-just under 500,000 claimants-eventually had
their case heard on appeal before an ALJ, 43 which resulted in an
37
38

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2000).
Id. (

The court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of
the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of
the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause
for a rehearing. The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to
any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive ....
). The Supreme Court has interpreted the substantial evidence standard to be extremely
deferential. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 11.2 (2000 cum. supp.); see also NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S.
292, 300 (1939) ("Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, and must do more than
create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established."); Consol. Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938) (stating that "substantial evidence" is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion"). Nevertheless, federal district courts reverse or remand the Social Security Administration's
disability determinations more than 50% of the time. Paul Verkuil &Jeffery Lubbers, Alternative Approaches tofJudicial Review of Social Security Disability Cases:A Report to the Social Security
Board, at 31 (Mar. 1, 2002), available at http://www.ssab.gov/VerkuilLubbers.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2005). Though district courts outright reverse only 6% of Social Security Administration disability determinations, fully 48% are remanded, resulting in a grant of
benefits about 60% of the time. SOCIAL SECURITY ADVIsoRY BOARD, supra note 1, chart 67.
39 SeeJohnson v. Heckler, 741 F.2d 948, 952-53 (7th Cir. 1984); Parker v. Harris, 626
F.2d 225, 231-32 (2d Cir. 1980). But see Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467 (1986)
(permitting a full trial in the district court). The Social Security statute itself does provide
for a single, narrow exception. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2000) (
[The courti may at any time order additional evidence to be taken before
the Commissioner of Social Security, but only upon a showing that there is
new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure
to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding ....
). This exception is further examined infra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
40
See Johnson, 741 F.2d at 952 ("A trial de novo is improper."); Parer,626 F.2d at 231
("Assuming the Secretary has applied proper legal principles, judicial review is limited to
an assessment of whether the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence .. ").
41
SOCIAL SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD,supra note 1,chart 67 (showing the total applications filed to be 1,988,425).
42
Id. (equaling about 1,232,824 applications).
43
See id. (showing that ALJs decided a total of 433,584 cases in fiscal year 2000).
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award of benefits 59% of the time. 44 Significantly, approximately 22%
of all Social Security disability claimants had a hearing before an
ALJ, 45 and about 23% of all claimants who were awarded benefits had
their benefits awarded by an ALJ. 4 6 Less than one percent of all claimants had their case heard at the federal court level. 47 Consequently,
because ALJs play such a prominent role in a significant number of
disability claims, if they indeed harbor unacceptable general biases
the potential for widespread negative impact is great-and correction
in the federal courts is only a fleeting remedy.
General Bias on Display: Two Cases

C.

Given the combination of an ALJ's significance in awarding Social Security disability benefits, the limited federal court review of benefits claims, and the sheer number of Social Security disability benefits
claims filed per year, ALJ bias is a potentially immense problem. In
Part 111, this Note will use the following two cases to demonstrate both
how general bias is manifested in Social Security disability cases and
that the problem is largely without satisfactory remedy in either the
Social Security Administration or the federal courts.
1.

48
Grant v. Sullivan

Social Security disability claimant and plaintiff Lois M. Grant filed
in federal court an appeal from the decision of ALJ Russell Rowell on
June 17, 1988. 4 9 In addition to the standard ground for appeal-that
ALJ Rowell's decision was not supported by substantial eidenceGrant also alleged that "ALJ Rowell, who presided over [her administrative] hearing and rendered a decision denying her application for
disability benefits, was biased against her and against disability claimants generally." 50 Grant contended that ALJ Rowell manifested his
44 Id. This does not equate to a 41% denial rate. Dismissals account for 12% of total
dispositions as well. SociAL SEcuirry ADVISORY BOARD, supra note 1, chart 67.
45
See id. (showing that 433,584 of 1,988,425 cases were heard by an ALJ).
46
Id. (showing that ALJs granted 253,615 of 1,106,344 total allowances).
47
See id. (showing that federal courts decided only 12,011 Social Security disability
cases in fiscal year 2000). Still, in fiscal year 2000, over 15,000 new Social Security disability
appeals were filed in federal district courts-constituting more than 5% of the civil docket.
Verkuil & Lubbers, supra note 38, at 9, 29.
48
720 F. Supp. 462 (M.D. Pa. 1989), rev'd sub nom. Grant v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 1332 (3d
Cir. 1993), remanded sub nom. to Grant v. Comm'r, 111 F. Supp. 2d 556 (M.D. Pa. 2000).
49
Grant v. Sullivan, 720 F. Supp. at 464.
50
Id, This was not the first time the Commissioner had been haled into court because of alleged general bias on the part of ALJ Rowell. Indeed, Judge Muir began his
opinion (the first in this litigation spanning over twelve years): "Once again we are
presented with a case in which a claimant or claimants for Social Security disability benefits
allege that Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Russell Rowell is biased against disability claimants generally." Id. at 463 (emphasis added). The opinion then cited several such cases,
includ ing Wallace v. Sullivan, CIV No. 88-0295, 1989 WL 109098 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 1989),
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bias when exercising discretion in making credibility determinations. 51 ALJ Rowell allegedly "use[d] his discretion to find that the
claimant and the witnesses supporting the claimant were not credible[,] thereby enabling him to conclude that the claimant was not
52
disabled and therefore not entitled to disability benefits."
Throughout the course of the litigation, several individuals testified regarding ALJ Rowell's bias against Social Security disability
claimants, including Michael Brown and Jaqueline Alois, both of
whom had previously worked with ALJ Rowell. 5" According to their
testimony, in the mind of ALJ Rowell, the critical decision to be made
in any case was whether the claimant could be considered a so-called
"no-goodnik" 54 on the one hand, or an "'upstanding citizen[ ] who
happened to have had a bad turn of luck"' on the other. 55 Brown
testified that although he did not know precisely what caused a claimant to be labeled a "no-goodnik," ALJ Rowell frequently assigned this
label to claimants who were "black, Hispanic, a poor white, a union
member, obese, allegedly mentally impaired, a workmen's compensation claimant, a controlled substance addict, a Department of Welfare
employee, or an accident victim." 56
ALJ Rowell apparently was bent on denying benefits to "no-goodniks," regardless of the law. 5 7 Alois claimed that, during one conversaand Schneck v. Bowen, CIV No. 88-0901, 1989 WL 109557 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 1989). In each
of these cases the claimants raised a general bias issue, but it was never ruled upon. Judge
Muir concluded his opening paragraph by noting that "this may be the case in which [the
court is] required to address the merits of whether ALJ Rowell is biased as alleged." Grant
v. Sullivan, 720 F. Supp. at 464.
51
52
5"-3
54

Id. at 469.

Id.
Grant v. Comm'r, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 558-61.
Id. at 559. According to Brown, ,AJ Rowell "referred to [claimants] in that manner
hundreds, if not thousands, of times." Id. (citing Brown's testimony before a Social Security Administration panel). Indicating the apparent frequency with which ALJ Rowell used
the term, Brown testified that the term appeared across the top of instruction sheets to
decision writers, as if no more needed to be said. See id.
55
Id. at 561 (quoting Alois's testimony before a Social Security Administration panel).
Brown also had the same impression. Summarizing Brown's testimony before a Social Security Administration hearing, one panel member said: "'Well, I gather then from your
testimony that the key determination for [ALJ Rowell] was the so-called no-goodnik determination . . . .'" Id. at 560 (alteration in original).
56 Id. at 559. This quotation, along with other evidence and testimony in the record,
raises the specter of racial and class bias. One could certainly make a strong case that ALJ
Rowell harbored such biases. Although that may be true, this Note focuses on that aspect
of ALJ Rowell's bias that can be classified as bias against Social Security claimants as a
group. This position is tenable given that the apparent qualifications of a "no-goodnik"
include much more than race- and class-based categorizations. Indeed, Grant herself
never alleged racial or class bias (the decisions do not even indicate her race or class), but
only that ALJ Rowell was biased "against disability claimants generally." Grant v. Sullivan,
720 F. Supp. at 464.
57 Grant v. Comm'r, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 560 ("'[0] nce [ALJ Rowell] made [a "no-goodnik"] determination, ... he sought a means to structure a denial regardless of what obsta-
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tion, ALJ Rowell "[sat her] down and explain[ed] to [her] why [he
was] not paying this case":
"[ALJ Rowell] had a theory about blacks, Hispanics, [and] poor
white people that he had developed while he was in California, and
that typically these people are drug addicts or alcoholics or have
decided to adopt a lifestyle where they just will not work no matter
what, that they preferred living on public monies, including welfare
payments, Worker's Compensation if they could get it if they had a
work history, and Social Security Benefits. He said that he did not

care what the evidence showed, that he did not care if his Decision
was reversed by the Appeals Council or the Courts, that he had no
58
intention of paying the case based on what he had."

In light of this statement, it is clear why Alois "'felt that [ALJ Rowell's
decisions] were not sound legal decisions based on the evidence."' 59
Brown further confirmed the lawlessness of ALJ Rowell, testifying that
[i] n a case involving a worker's compensation claim, "there was usually a manipulation of the earnings to distort the relation between
Worker's Comp and this individual's earnings while he was working." ALJ Rowell would do this deliberately to create a "misimpression." ALJ Rowell would use even the most minute discrepancy in
information provided by a disfavored claimant to undermine the
claimant's credibility. ALJ Rowell would manipulate medical
records even when he granted benefits so that it would be easier to
terminate those benefits at a later time. He would attempt "to circumvent" the applicable law. 60
Still more testimony supported Grant's allegation that ALJ Rowell
manifested bias in his credibility determinations. 61 For instance,
Brown testified that ALJ Rowell presumed "no-goodniks" to be unreliable and frequently stated that "'this is a matter of credibility, and
then he'd kind of chuckle, and that's bad for the claimant. It was
just-that was a normal part of the discourse."62 Even a fellow ALJ
testified that ALJ Rowell "had once said to him [that] 'Itihe issue is
credibility. And that's bad for the claimant."' 63 Statistical evidence
cles there might be in the record or the case law."' (quoting panel member's summary of
Brown's testimony before a Social Security Administration panel)).
58

Id. at 560-61 (quoting Alois's testimony before a Social Security Administration

panel).
51) Id. at 560 (quoting Alois's testimony before a Social Security Administration panel).
60

Id. at 559 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Brown's testimony before a Social

Security Administration panel).
61
SpeGrant v. Sullivan, 720 F. Supp at 468-69 (examining allegations by Louise 0.
Knight that ALJ Rowell had a reputation in Pennsylvania for being biased against disability
claimants).
62
Grant v. Comm'r, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 560 (quoting Brown's testimony before a Social
Security Administration panel).
63

Id. at 561

Stephenson).

(alteration in original) (quoting 1989 deposition of ALJ Garth
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supported this testimony. An initial special panel for the Social Security Administration investigated a sample of 212 of ALJ Rowell's cases
and found that he denied benefits in 53% of those cases. 64 The panel
reviewed 82 of those denials, finding that in 69 (84%) of them, ALJ
Rowell had "unlawfully determined that the claimant was not
65
credible."
One did not need to rely solely on hearsay and statistical data,
however. ALJ Rowell's own written opinions contain additional evidence manifesting bias against "no-goodniks." For instance, in at least
three decisions, ALJ Rowell repeatedly described claimants as "manip66
ulative" and labeled them as "malingerer[s]" and "prevaricator[s]."
64
Id. at 558. Recall that in fiscal year 2000, ALJs granted benefits an average of 59%
of the time. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
65
Grant v. Comm'r, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 558-59. Ironically, the court noted that the
Social Security Administration panel concluded that this evidence did not support "'any
conclusion concerning the claimant's racial or ethnic background."' Id. at 558. The court
felt differently, however, and asserted that "[although statistics in and of themselves may
have limited probative value, the fact that the information reviewed by the initial special
panel revealed such a significant number of unlawful credibility determinations is noteworthy." Id. at 559.
66
Id, at 562-63. The passages are too revealing not to quote at length. In the case of
Laura Tate-a mentally impaired African-American claimant who had previously been involved in several automobile accidents-ALJ Rowell wrote:
"Although the shenanigans of the claimant have effectively frustrated and
prevented the undersigned from more fully developing the evidence in this
case, the undersigned does draw the reasonable inference from the claimant's refusal to cooperate by providing the requested series of automobile
accidents for the primary if not the sole purpose of collecting insurance
monies and other financial benefits. The fact that she would defraud insurance companies in such a manner establishes that she would not hesitate to
lie in regard to her impairments, restrictions and limitations in regard to
her claim for Social Security benefits. . . . The claimant is found to be a
prevaricator, is manipulative and is a malingerer."
Id. at 562 (quoting ALJ Rowell's decision). How ALJ Rowell could conclude that Tate had
defrauded insurance companies merely from her apparent inability to placate ALJ Russell's
request for documentation is as much the reader's guess as it is this author's. Ultimately,
the court noted that "[tlhe Laura Tate case is a specific instance where ALJ Rowell made
judgments against the claimant once he knew merely that she had a number of his disfavored characteristics." Id. at 559. The true meaning of the above-quoted statement may lie
in ALJ Rowell's extra-legal fixation on a concept of "secondary gain." This, along with
corroboration of Alois's "California theory" testimony, is evidenced in the case of B.L.H.:
"[The claimant's] lifestyle can be described as having adjusted to a no-work
lifestyle without any productive activity either in or out of the home,
whereby she stays home mostly lying down and watches television and receives help with household chores from her daughter. The secondary gains
accruable to the claimant's ongoing efforts to obtain disability benefits,
compounded by her no-work lifestyle and protestation of pain and limitations, unsupported by the objective medical evidence adequately support
the conclusion that the claimant's testimony is not credible. Also, it is concluded that she is manipulative and a malingerer."
Id. at 562 (quoting ALJ Rowell's decision). ALJ Rowell obviously crafted his credibility
determinations to serve the goal of denying benefits to "no-goodnik" claimants, even if, as
Alois and Brown testified, he circumvented the law in the process. In the case of L.A.Z., for
example, AIJ Rowell concluded that the claimant used "considerable manipulative behav-
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Moreover, these decisions also provide anecdotal evidence of ALJ
Rowell's practice of discounting not only the testimony of claimants,
but also their physicians-based solely on the claimant's purported
incredibility!

67

Although Ms. Grant did obtain a ruling that ALJ Rowell was biased,68 the route to that final determination was undeniably inadequate-and more than twelve years late. The district court attempted
to conduct its own discovery into ALJ Rowell's bias, but was prevented
from doing so by the Third Circuit. 69 In the midst of that litigation,
however, the Social Security Administration felt the pressure to investigate on its own, which revealed the statements from ALJ Rowell's coworkers recounted above. 70 Even still, the Administration found that
ALJ Rowell was not biased. In the end, the district court reversed that
Administration determination, finding it not to be supported by substantial evidence; 71 but as Part II will show, the court's ruling lacks the
firm legal grounding future claimants (and legal purists) may have
desired-and indeed needed.

ior during the course of the [administrative] hearing," recounting several of his personal
observations of the claimant. Id. at 562-63. Contrary to the regulations, he then used
these observations as the basis of his unfavorable credibility determination. See id. at 563;
see also Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 502 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that personal observations of the ALJ are entitled to limited weight).
See Grant v. Comm'r, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 563. In the case of C.S., ALJ Rowell dis67
counted the claimant's physician, Dr. Hawk, because he had "relied primarily on claimant's representations, and . . . ha[d] given full credibility thereto. Accordingly it [was]
concluded that Dr. Hawk haid] been manipulated by the claimant, and Dr. Hawk's impression of inability to engage in work activity [was] rejected and... receive[d] no weight." Id.
Discounting a treating physician's opinion for this reason is in clear violation of the regulations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d) (2), 416.927(d)(2) (2004). Finally, ALJ Rowell's decision in the case of L.T. displays the full panoply of his lawless tactics:
"[I]t is concluded that no weight will be given to the opinions advanced by
Mr. Anderson [L.T.'s doctor], and his views are rejected. It is evident that
Mr. Anderson's views and opinions are based to a large extent upon his
assessment of full credibility to the claimant's descriptions of [her
In brief, it appears that Mr. Anderson has been had, and obvipain] ....
ously, has been manipulated by a scheming, manipulative, malingering,
and prevaricating claimant into expressing views and opinions based largely
upon assessment of full credibility of her representations ....
Grant v. Comm'r, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 563 (quoting ALJ Rowell's decision).
Id. at 569 ("The only conclusion to be drawn after considering all of the evidence
68
in the record is that ALJ Rowell harbored biases which rendered him unable to fulfill his
duty . . . to decide cases fairly. Those biases were clearly manifested in the manner in
which ALJ Rowell made credibility determinations." (footnote omitted)).
See infra notes 140-48 and accompanying text.
69
See infra Part II.B.2.
70
71
See infra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
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72
Pronti v. Barnhart

Pronti v. Barnhartis only at the beginning of potentially years-long
court and agency litigation. In contrast to Grant, which involved a
substantial record clearly illustrating ALJ Rowell's biases, 73 this case
presents a rather pure look at the problems many claimants face when
attempting to prove ALJ bias within the confines of the Social Security
disability regulations. The plaintiff, Anne M. Pronti, filed an appeal in
federal court on June 10, 2002 from the decision of ALJ Franklin T.
Russell. As in Grant,74 Pronti claims both that the decision was not
supported by substantial evidence and that ALJ Russell is not "free of
bias against claimants seeking disability benefits. ' 75 The plaintiffs
amended complaint alleged that ALJ Russell had "freely stated to
counsel and others over the last six years that he requires very completely documented proof of every single aspect of disability before he
will grant a case and that his personal goal is to protect the public
'7 6
treasury.
With one exception 7 7 (which did not indicate bias as clearly as
ALJ Rowell's harsh slurs78 ), Pronti does not attribute any inflammatory comments to ALJ Russell. Instead, Pronti filed numerous affidavits from lawyers who practice before ALJ Russell. 79 According to
80
Pronti, these lawyers "understand and know his bias thoroughly."
339 F. Supp. 2d 480 (W.D.N.Y. 2004).
See supra Part I.C.I.
74 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
75 Am. Complaint 1 36, Pronti v. Barnhart, 339 F. Supp. 2d 480 (W.D.N.Y. 2004) (No.
02-CV-6309L(F)) [hereinafter ProntiAm. Compl.].
76
Id. 16. ScottJ. Learned, an attorney who represented numerous claimants before
ALJ Russell, recounts this statement. In his sworn affidavit, Learned describes a hearing in
which ALJ Russell interrogated a vocational expert, "ask[ing] a number of leading questions" after the expert opined in a manner supporting a benefit award for the claimant.
Aft.of ScottJ. Learned 1 8, Pronti (No. (02-CV-6309L(F)) [hereinafter Learned Aft.]. Regarding this interrogation, Learned states:
I objected, indicating that the vocational expert had . . . rendered [an]
"impartial opinion" [as ALJ Russell had requested]. Judge Russell then
sharply informed me that he could ask whatever questions he wanted, in his
role as the "guardian of the Social Security Trust Fund". I again objected,
stating my belief that [ALJ Russell's] role was to impartially weigh the evidence. He then attempted to minimize the previous remark by asserting
that he "wore several hats."
Id.
77 See supra note 76.
78 See, e.g., supra notes 54, 56, 58, 66, 67 and accompanying text.
79 See Learned Aft., supranote 76; Aff. of William J. McDonald, Jr., Pronti (No. (02-CV6309L(F)) [hereinafter McDonald Aff.]; Aft. of Andrew M. Rothstein, Pronti (No. (02-CV6309L(F)) [hereinafter Rothstein Aff.]; Aft. of Gregg A. Thomas, Pronti v. Barnhart
(W.D.N.Y. 2004) (No. (02-CV-6309L(F)) [hereinafter Thomas AMt.]; Aft. of Amanda C. L.
Vig, Pronti (No. (02-CV-6309L(F)) [hereinafter Vig Aff.]. It is not even clear that the court
can properly consider these affidavits. See supra note 38-40 and accompanying text, infra
Part II.C.
80 ProntiAm. Compl., supra note 75, 1 19.
72

73

GENERAL BIAS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES

2005]

783

This bias, the complaint concludes, causes ALJ Russell to "regularly
'
approve[ ] a very low percentage of the cases that come before him."
The affiants point to several indicators of ALJ Russell's bias. First,
as in Grant, Pronti alleges that ALJ Russell uses his discretion inappropriately to attack the credibility of claimants. 82 Second, the affiants
claim that ALJ Russell erroneously discounts the opinions of claimants' treating physicians. 8 3 Finally, Pronti claims that even when ALJ
Russell awards benefits to a claimant, he has "a penchant" for using
his discretion to find a later disability onset date than the one claimants allege, which results in decreased benefit payments.8 4 All of these
81

Id.

20.

One lawyer, Gregg A. Thomas, states that ALJ Russell "uses an illegal standard in
judging claimants' credibility," and will "search for any apparent inconsistencies in a claimant's medical record, testimony, or written statement to SSA in order to challenge a claim24. According to Thomas, ALJ Russell
ant's credibility." Thomas Aft., supra note 79,
manages to find such inconsistencies even where none exist. Id. For example, "if a claimant's medical records fail to reflect a history of repeated complaints about pain or functional limitations in each and every note in a treating source's records... ALJ Russell ...
cites the lack of objective, clinical evidence as a reason to disbelieve a claimant's testimony." Id. Another lawyer, William T. McDonald,Jr., correctly points out that ALJ Russell
applies the wrong legal standard in making his credibility assessments by requiring claim18-19.
ants to fully substantiate their claims of pain. McDonald Aft., supra note 79,
Indeed, the regulations only require that a claimant's description of pain merely be consistent with the objective medical evidence, not fully substantiatedby it. SeeYouney v. Barnhart,
280 F. Supp. 2d 52, 61 n.4 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing 20 C.F.R §§ 404.1529(b), 416.929(b),
147748, at
404.1529(c) (3), 416.929(c) (3) and Castillo v. Apfel, No. 98 CIV. 0792, 1999 ANIL
*7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 1999)). According to McDonald, ALJ Russell's use of an erroneous
standard resulted in a finding that his clients were credible only 11% of the time. McDonald Aft., supra note 79, 22.
23. The
13-17; Thomas Aft., supra note 79,
83 McDonald Aft., supra note 79,
regulations require ALJs to afford a treating physician's uncontradicted opinion "controlling weight." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d) (2), 416.927(d)(2) (2004). If the treating physician's opinion is contradicted, the regulations may nonetheless require an ALJ to afford
the opinion at least some extra weight, based on several factors (such as the length, nature,
and extent of the treatment relationship, and whether the opinion is supported by other
evidence). Id. McDonald accuses ALJ Russell of being "much less critical of [a] medical
opinion which is unfavorable to the claimant," regardless of the source. McDonald Aft.,
supra note 79, 1 16. Thomas alleges that ALJ Russell "has no problem" subordinating
treating physicians' reports and instead "adopting the adverse opinions" of Social Security
Administration physicians, who merely review a claimant's medical records or examine the
claimant a single time. Thomas Aft., supra note 79, 23. In McDonald's experience, ALJ
Russell has given a claimant's treating physician's opinion controlling weight only 12% of
the time and little or no weight 26% of the time. McDonald Aft., supra note 79, 1 14. In
further violation of the regulations, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d) (2), 416.927 (d)(2) (2004),
ALJ Russell fails even to indicate how much weight he gave a claimant's treating physician
a majority (53%) of the time, see McDonald Aft., supra note 79, 1 14.
84 Learned Aff., supra note 76, 1 12. Claimants are paid benefits only from the determined date of the onset of their disability, which results in only a partial victory for a
claimant awarded benefits from a date later than that originally asked. If appealed, however, a claimant risks a complete denial of benefits. This, says one affiant, "confronts the
claimant with the Hobson's choice of risking current benefits by seeking further Appeals
Council review." Id. 1 12; see also Letter from Andrew M. Rothstein, attorney, to Hon. John
R. Tarrant, Chief Administrative LawJudge (Sept. 4, 2002) (submitted with Rothstein Aft.,
82
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allegations add up to what Pronti claims is ALJ Russell's modus operandi
for effectuating his bias against Social Security disability claimants: a
5
higher standard of proof than the regulations require.
Pronti's affiants further allege (reminiscent of ALJ Rowell's lawlessness in Grant806 ) that ALJ Russell manipulates the record so as to
make it more unfavorable to claimants. ALJ Russell allegedly accomplishes this by holding the record open after a claimant's administrative hearing has concluded,8 7 refusing to allow attorneys to respond to
his comments, s8 and holding supplemental hearings "solely for the
purpose of creating evidence to rationalize his decision to deny
benefits."8 9
In what may be the most persuasive evidence of bias, however, the
affiants detail the rate at which ALJ Russell has denied benefits to
their clients. By dividing ALJ Russell's final dispositions into three categories-fully favorable, partially favorable, and denied-the affiants
support their allegations that ALJ Russell's denial rate is extremely
high. According to the affiants, ALJ Russell denied between 41% and
76% of their clients' claims, 90 making a weighted average denial rate
of 58% across the four affiants who provided data. Even a favorable
supra note 79) [hereinafter Rothstein Letter] ("Judge Russell has changed the onset date,
to the detriment of the claimants, 41% of the time. The otherJudges did so in only 12% of
the approvals."); Vig Aft., supra note 79,
7 ("Of the six [decisions] that have been partially favorable, five were given a later onset date than the claimants' alleged date of onset."). According to McDonald, instances where ALJ Russell employs this technique prove
the point made earlier regarding credibility assessments, see supra note 82; curiously, ALJ
Russell will accept a claimant's testimony as credible after the later onset date. See McDonald Aft., supra note 79, 1 20.
85
Pronti Am. Compl., supra note 75, 18; see also Learned Aft., supra note 76,
2
("[ALJ] Russell has demonstrated a consistent pattern of holding claimants to a standard
of proof far higher than that set forth in the Social Security Regulations and Rulings.");
Rothstein Aft., supra note 79, 4 ("ALJ Russell requires facts approaching proof beyond a
reasonable doubt ....").

See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
Vig Aff., supra note 79, 11. The implication is that once ALJ Russell has all of the
evidence supporting a claimant's application, he can then fill the record with counterevidence. See id.
88
McDonald Aft., supra note 79, 77 5-7. McDonald states that in one hearing he
requested an opportunity to respond to ALJ Russell's comments, to which ALJ Russell
"stated that the hearing was closed, that he refused to permit me to make any further
statement on the record and he instructed the clerk to turn off the tape recorder." Id. 5.
McDonald subsequently requested and received a copy of the tape; however, the tape no
longer contained the above exchange. Id. 11 6-7.
89
Thomas Aft., supra note 79,
20; see also id. 25 ("ALJ Russell improperly uses
vocational experts to concoct evidence to support his adverse findings.").
90
Four affiants provided data on the total number of their clients' cases that ALJ
Russell decided and how many of these decisions fit into each of the three above-mentioned categories. Based on a total of 17 cases, Vig claims a 41% denial rate. See Vig Aft.,
supra note 79, 1 6. Out of 72 cases, affiant Rothstein claims a 46% denial rate. See Rothstein Letter, supra note 84. Out of 19 cases, affiant Thomas claims a 63% denial rate. See
Thomas Aft., supra note 79, 1 14. And out of 58 cases, afflant McDonald claims a 76%
denial rate. See McDonald Aft., supra note 79, 11.
86
87
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decision from ALJ Russell was often only a marginal victory. Across
the affiants, ALJ Russell's approvals were only partially favorable 51%
of the time, ranging from as low as 41% to as high as 74%. 9 t
These numbers are impressive by themselves, but only when held
against some objective standard do the claims of bias against ALJ Russell become convincing. Affiant Rothstein demonstrates the point by
comparing his clients' record before ALJ Russell-46% denial, 41%
partially favorable approvals-with his other clients' record before all
92
other ALJs-9% denial, 12% of approvals only partially favorable.
Affiant McDonald uses nationally reported statistics to support his
claim that ALJ Russell is biased. He claims that his experience before
ALJ Russell, which has produced a 75% denial rate, is not in line with
the national average of 29%. 93 Indeed, these statistics comport with
the figures affiant Rothstein obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request. 94 These data show that ALJ Russell's 63% denial rate
is well above that of other ALJs both in his region (43%) and in the
entire country (34%).95 These data also show that the national rate of
partially favorable decisions is only 8%,96 while ALJ Russell's partial
97
approval rate among the affiants is 51%.
91

Of the 39 total approvals for affiant Rothstein, 41% were only partially favorable.

See Rothstein Letter, supra note 84. Of the 7 total approvals for affiant Thomas, 4 were

14. Of the 10 total approvals for
partially favorable. See Thomas Aft., supra note 79,
6. And of the 14 total
affiant Vig, 6 were partially favorable. Vig Aff., supra note 79,
approvals for affiant McDonald, ]0 were only partially favorable. McDonald Aft., supra
11.
note 79,
92 See Rothstein Letter, supra note 84; see also Vig Aff., supranote 79, 9 (claiming that
other Judges had an 18% denial rate and that only 17% of their approvals were partially
favorable, compared to 41% and 60%, respectively, with ALJ Russell).
93
McDonald Aff., supra note 79, 1 12, exhibit 1 (citing SOcIAL SECuRrTY ADWiSORv
BoARD, supra note 1, chart 67). To be fair, in order to compare the national ALJ denial
rate with McDonald's figures, dismissals should be excluded from the calculations. Once
this is done, the national denial rate is about 33%, which is still significantly below AL)
Russell's denial rate. See SoCIAL SECURITy ADvisoRY BOARD, supra note 1, chart 67.

94 See Letter from Andrew M. Rothstein, attorney, to Mr. Jack Wolf, Information Disclosure Specialist, Office of Hearings and Appeals (July 9, 2002) (submitted with Rothstein
Aft., supra note 79).
95 Letter from Social Security Administration to Andrew M. Rothstein (July 2, 2003)
(on file with Court Reporter to Judge David G. Larimer, United States District Court for
the Western District of New York, in connection with Prontiv. Barnhart,339 F. Supp. 2d 480
(W.D.N.Y. 2004) (No. 02-CV-6309L(F))).
96
Id.
97
See supra note 91 and accompanying text. The Social Security Administration offered to Affiant Rothstein the following possible explanations for the aberrations:
" The ALJs who serve as Hearing Office ChiefJudges sometimes handle a
large part of the dismissal workload, particularly those that involve late

filing.
"

Other workloads may not be assigned randomly. Depending upon the
types of cases worked, these differences could either increase or decrease individual allowance rates. Factors such as the age of claimants,
their education and work history, and the nature of their impairments
can affect outcomes.
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In September 2004, the district court remanded the Pronticase to
the Social Security Administration for additional fact finding on the
issue of ALJ Russell's general bias. 9s The Administration has yet to
make any findings. What is important to notice thus far, however, is
the importance of statistical evidence in demonstrating (if not conclusively proving) that a claimant was indeed the victim of ALJ general
bias-evidence on which the district court relied despite the uncertain propriety of doing so. That an ALJ applying what are supposed to
be semimechanical regulations and standards can have approval rates
so out of line from the regional and national norm is beyond credibility. Without invidious comments demonstrating an ALJ's bias (such as
those exhibited by ALJ Rowell9 9 ), the ability to review many cases at
once is essential for plaintiffs hoping to prove an ALJ's general bias. 100
The current system, however, makes doing so nearly impossible.
II
INADEQUATE PROCEDURES: How THE REGULATIONS AND

REVIEW PROCESS PREVENT MEANINGFUL REDRESS

With Grant and Pronti serving as a backdrop, this Part addresses
the various evidentiary, procedural, and practical obstacles claimants
face when attempting to obtain redress for denials at the hands of a
generally biased ALJ. The task here is to examine the adequacy of
what typically would be the first and most obvious avenues of redress
for such claimants: the process provided by the Social Security Act and
regulations. As this Part will show, however, there is no adequate recourse there to be found.
" To expedite the hearing process, some ALJs are used to identify cases
that can be paid without a hearing. Clearing a large number of those
cases will increase a given ALJ's allowance rate.
* ALJs are independent decision-makers. They cannot be influenced by
the Agency into issuing specific decisions (i.e., favorable or
unfavorable).
" When issuing decisions, ALJs rely on SSA law, which can and does vary
among judicial jurisdictions.
Letter from WillieJ. Polk, Freedom of Information Officer, Social Security Administration,
to Andrew M. Rothstein, attorney (July 2, 2003) (submitted with Rothstein Aff., supra note
79). Whether these justifications are valid or applicable to AIJ Russell is something the
district court may one day face. See infra note 230 and accompanying text (threatening to
use the court's mandamus jurisdiction to decide the issue of AL Russell's alleged bias).
98 Pronti v. Barnhart, 339 F. Supp. 2d 480, 501 (W.D.N.Y. 2004).
99
100

See supra notes 54, 56, 58, 66, 67 and accompanying text.
See Miller v. Poretsky, 595 F.2d 780, 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Robinson,J. concurring)

("Absent something amounting well nigh to an open admission of discriminatory purpose,

victims may find it virtually impossible to prove that fact unless permitted to introduce
evidence that the defendant has engaged in one or more acts of discrimination against
others."); supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
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Disqualification of the ALJ

The first place to which a claimant would naturally turn when
confronted with a biased ALJ is the Social Security disability regulations. The regulations provide that "[a]n administrative law judge
shall not conduct a hearing if he or she is prejudiced or partial."''
The procedures a claimant must follow to enforce this regulation are,
however, quite uncomfortable. An objecting claimant must first notify
the ALJ in question at the claimant's "earliest opportunity," at which
point the ALJ "shall consider [the claimant's] objections and shall decide whether to proceed with the hearing or withdraw."'10 2 Aside from
the obvious absurdity of having the very person accused of bias deciding whether to recuse himself,10 3 this regulation cannot practically address the problem of a generally biased ALJ.
That a claimant would even be aware of an ALJ's general bias at
such a stage in the proceedings is dubious. As noted in Small v. Sullivan, "a general predisposition to deny disability claims is not the sort
of bias a person would perceive at the time an administrative hearing
is held." 10 4 Because there may be only one or two indications of bias
per case, 105 to be able credibly to object at the hearing level would
require knowledge gathered from many experiences with a particular
ALJ. To place such a burden on claimants is unrealistic and impairs
the right to object in the first place.
One could argue that an ALJ's general bias, even if not known to
the claimant, should be known to his lawyer by word-of-mouth and
prior experience with an ALJ. There are several significant counterpoints to such a claim, however. As an initial matter, in 2000, at least
13% of claimants were unrepresented in their administrative hearings.10 6 In addition, roughly 17% were represented by non-attorneys.' 0 7 Relying solely on lawyers to protect against ALJ general bias,
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.940, 416.1440 (2004).
Id.; see also Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 902 (3d Cir. 1995) (detailing the steps
the claimant took to have the ALJ removed pursuant to the regulation).
103
If you imagine a claimant who must ask ALJ Rowell to recuse himself because he is
biased, the unlikelihood of a claimant actually employing such a remedy becomes readily
apparent-especially if the claimant is unrepresented. See also Pronti v. Barnhart, 339 F.
Supp. 2d 480, 496 (W.D.N.Y. 2004) ("Assuming an ALJ was biased, it stands to reason that
he would not admit as much by agreeing to withdraw from the case.").
820 F. Supp. 1098, 1105 (S.D. Ill. 1992) (citing Kendrick v. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp.
104
94, 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) and Grant v. Sullivan, 720 F. Supp. 462, 472 (M.D. Pa. 1989)); see
also Pronti, 339 F. Supp. 2d at 495 ("[The evidence of bias] was not available to plaintiff
Pronti at the time of her ... hearing before ALJ Russell . .. ").
105 Recall that the only overt evidence of general bias by ALJ Russell in the Pronti case
was his comment regarding his supposed role as the protector of the public treasury. See
supra note 76.
101

102

106
107

See SOCIAL SECURITY ADviSORY BOARD, supra note 1, chart 56.
See id.
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therefore, will not solve the problem for many claimants.,
Furthermore, not all attorneys can be expected to know of a given ALJ's general bias. A lawyer may be new to either Social Security disability law
or to a particular ALJ. Indeed, the Grant case provides anecdotal evidence that this does take place; Ms. Grant's attorney had never before
handled a Social Security disability case. 0 9
Even if claimants could meet such a burden, however, the regulation providing for the objection would still be inadequate because it
provides only for objections to prejudice or partiality "with respect to
anyparty or... any interest in the matter pending for decision."11 0 The
language of the regulation indicates that it is only designed to address
instances of specific bias, not general bias.1 1' At least two courts, including the court in Pronti, have recognized the restrictive nature of
this regulation regarding claims of general bias:
[I1f plaintiffs were required to present their bias claim at the administrative level, they would simply be confronted with administrative
procedures which are not designed to address the problem of an
administrative law judge who is generally biased against claimants. ... [TJhe Social Security regulations do not allow for disqualification of an administrative law judge on the ground of general
112
bias and unfitness.
108

Such reliance would also be contrary to the general nature of Social Security pro-

ceedings, which are intended to be nonadversarial. See20 C.F.R. § 404.900(b) (2004) (providing that the Social Security Administration will "conduct the administrative review
process in an informal, nonadversary manner"); see also Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110-12
(2000) (discussing the inquisitorial-as opposed to adversarial-nature of Social Security
proceedings).
109 Ms. Grant's attorney provided an affidavit with the following relevant declarations:
Prior to the time of Plaintiff Grant's case I had never handled a Social Security case as an attorney, and I had no prior knowledge of ALJJudge [sic]
Russell Rowell ....

At no time during the course of the hearing proceedings nor through
the time of the appeal to the Appeals Council was I aware of the existence
of a claim of bias on the part of ALJ Rowell towards Plaintiff Grant nor
towards Social Security claimants in general. . . . I first became aware of a

possible claim of bias when on May 13, 1988 I had a telephone conversation
with Peter B. Macky[, who] . . . had extensive experience with Social Security cases and . . . [informed me of) several cases where a claim of bias was
being lodged against ALJ Rowell.
Grant v. Sullivan, 720 F. Supp. at 469 (first alteration in original).
t 10 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.940, 416.1440 (2004) (emphasis added).
111
See supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text (discussing the difference between
specific and general bias).
112
Kendrick v. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. 94, 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); see also Pronti v. Barnhart, 339 F. Supp. 2d 480 (W.D.N.Y. 2004) (
[B]ased on the record before the Court, there are serious questions as to
whether 20 C.F.R. § 404.940 is an adequate mechanism when the bias alleged does not relate to a particular plaintiff, but is based on a claim that
the ALJ is generally biased against all Social Security claimants.
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Therefore, if the regulation is used strictly for its intended purpose-as it should be-it is apparent that, in addition to the unpleasant burden of objecting directly to the judge accused of bias,
objecting to the ALJ on the basis of general bias is also an inadequate
solution.
B.

Appeals Council Review
1.

The Regulations

After an unfavorable ALJ decision, a claimant may appeal directly
to the Social Security Appeals Council. To obtain Council review, a
113
claimant must appeal the decision within sixty days of its issuance.
The Appeals Council decides whether to review the decision at all
and, if it chooses to do so, either affirms or reverses the ALJ's decision.114 This appellate process, however, solves precisely none of the
evidentiary problems relevant to general bias.
At the heart of the inadequacy is that the Appeals Council only
examines the record created at the ALJ hearing level. Although the
regulations appear to allow the presentation of "new" evidence, such
evidence must also be "material."' 15 Given that the Social Security
For many reasons, this regulation is not well-suited to claims of general
bias . .. [T]he Appeals Council reviews claims of bias on a case-by-case
basis only, which does not take into account the nature of a claim of general bias.
This is precisely what occurred in Ballard [a companion case to Pronti].
In response to the plaintiff's allegation that ALJ Russell was biased generally
against claimants, the Appeals Council responded in its decision denying
review of the case as follows:
The Appeals Council has considered your representative's
contention that the Administrative Law Judge has a bias in
general against disability claimants because of the low percentage of favorable decisions he issues for your representative's
clients. The Appeals Council considers each case which comes
before it on an individual basis. The Council found no indication that the Administrative Law Judge adjudicated your claim
on a basis other than his evaluation of the issues and evidence
of record. Accordingly, the Appeals Council finds no support
for your representative's contention that the Administrative
Law Judge is biased.
S.. [S]erious questions exist regarding whether § 404.940 is merely a
futile remedy for a plaintiff seeking to raise a general bias claim ....
(citations omitted)); Grant v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 1332, 1354 (3d Cir. 1993) (Higginbotham,
J., dissenting) ("[T]hose regulations [20 C.F.R. §§ 404.940, 416.1440] are obviously not
designed to handle claims of general bias.").
113
20 C.F.R. § 404.968(a)(1) (2004). The issues presented on appeal to the Appeals
Council include any decision by an ALJ not to withdraw from a case due to alleged bias. See
id. §§ 404.940, 416.1440 ("If the administrative lawjudge does not withdraw, you may, after
the hearing, present your objections to the Appeals Council as reasons why the hearing
decision should be revised or a new hearing held before another administrative law
judge.").
114 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.967 (2004).
115 Id. § 404.976(b) (1).
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regulations fail to provide for the removal of an AL on the grounds of
general bias, 1 16 such evidence would not be material to the claimant's
case. Thus, there is no opportunity to present any evidence sufficient
to prove general bias-namely, evidence from other claimants'
cases. 1 17 Without such evidence in the record, and with no opportunity independently to present it to the Appeals Council, general bias is
impossible to prove. Recall that in both Grant and Pronti, anecdotes
and statistics culled from many cases were necessary to establish general bias on the part of the ALJs. 1 5 Because the current procedures
make it nearly impossible to introduce such evidence to the Appeals
Council, 119 the current "solution" to general bias claims is really no
120
solution at all.
Furthermore, even if a claimant were able to offer evidence of
general bias to the Appeals Council, the sixty-day time period is insufficient for a claimant or his representative to identify and document
an ALJ's previously unrecognized general bias. 1 1 As shown above,
courts have already recognized the time and serendipity necessary to

See supra Part 1I.A.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.976(b)(1) (2004) (providing that "[tlhe Appeals Council will
consider all the evidence in the administrative law judge hearing record as well as any new
and material evidence submitted to it which relates to the period on or before the date of
the administrative law judge hearing decision"); see also Pronti, 339 F. Supp. 2d at 496
("'The Appeals Council considers each case which comes before it on an individual basis.
The Council found no indication that the Administrative Law Judge adjudicated your claim
on a basis other than his evaluation of the issues and evidence of record.'" (quoting the
Appeals Council decision) (emphasis added)).
118 See, e.g., supra notes 64-67, 83-97 and accompanying text (recounting the statistical
evidence presented in the Grant and Pronticases).
Indeed, if the claimant were to gather such evidence of general bias, he may be
119
denied a hearing on the issue due to the requirement of issue exhaustion. If the claimant
had not raised the issue of general bias at the hearing level, the Appeals Council would not
have considered the issue on appeal. This practice has apparently been abandoned with
the procedures detailed in Social Security Administration Procedures Concerning Allegations of Bias or Misconduct by Administrative Law Judges, 57 Fed. Reg. 49,186 (Oct. 30,
1992) [hereinafter Bias Procedures]. See infra Part II.B.2.
120
Whether this particular regulation was intended to be the Social Security Administration's solution to general bias is beside the point. Courts that currently dismiss claims of
general bias due to lack of evidence simultaneously-and strangely, given the above analysis-cite §§ 404.940 and 416.1440 as the proper regulations to use for dealing with it. See,
e.g., Hopper v. Barnhart, 02-CV-6387(CJS) (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2003) (claiming that there
was "no reason why the regulation could not be used to raise a claim of systematic bias");
Sanborn v. Barnhart, 02-CV-6399(CJS) (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2003) (consolidated case).
121
See, e.g., Pronti,339 F. Supp. 2d at 495 ("[The evidence of bias] was not available to
plaintiff Pronti . . . when she made her ...request for review by the Appeals Council.");
Grant v. Sullivan, 720 F. Supp. 462, 469 (M.D. Pa. 1989) ("'At no time during the course of
the hearing proceedings nor though the time of the appeal to the Appeals Council was I aware of
the existence of a claim of bias on the part of ALJ Rowell towards Plaintiff Grant nor
towards Social Security claimants in general"' (quoting affidavit by Grant's attorney) (emphasis added)).
116

117
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discover that an ALJ harbors a general bias.' 22 Thus, the Appeals
Council process cannot squarely address problems of general bias.
2.

"Interim" Procedures

During the ongoing proceedings in the Grant case, and ostensibly
with an eye toward remedying the problem of discovering bias in a
timely manner, the Social Security Administration issued "interim"
procedures to deal with complaints of bias against ALJs. t 23 Close ex1 24
amination of these procedures, however, reveals latent inadequacy.
The "key features" of the procedures provide that: (1) claimants have
the ability to file a complaint of bias with the Office of Hearings and
Appeals (which oversees ALJs); (2) claimants be "notified" as to the
progress of their complaint, and assured that it will be "investigated
promptly;" and (3) claimants be "notified" as to the decision reached
and action taken, if any, in response to the complaint.1 25 Furthermore, in revealing language, the procedure provides that:
If a complaint is filed after a decision by an Administrative Law
Judge on a claim for benefits has been issued, but before the expiration of the time for filing a request for review by the Appeals Council, the claimant and his or her representative will be notified in
writing that ... the complaint may be presented to the Appeals
Council as a basis for granting review; that the allegations will be
reviewed as part of the request for review; and that, regardless of the
final decision on the merits of the claim for benefits, the complainant and his or her representative will be informed of the results of the
review.126
Though acknowledging the problem of general bias, this procedure
does little to solve it. It appears that the Administration sought simply
to issue a rule that would relax court scrutiny but avoid dealing with
127
AL general bias.
See supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text. Although these comments specifi122
cally address the problems involved with requiring claimants to raise the issue of general
bias in front of the ALJ at the hearing level, the same logic applies to raising such objections before the Appeals Council,
123 See Bias Procedures, supra note 119, at 49,187.
124 A cynic might suggest that the procedures purposely are shrouded in language
merely intended to assuage irate victims of ALJ general bias while carefully creating an
impotent process in the Social Security Administration and federal courts. See infra notes
128-36 and accompanying text. ALJs' general biases, therefore, remain protected by the
system and the Social Security Administration does not earnestly have to confront the issue
of general bias. Lending support to this theory is the fact that despite all of the evidence
recounted in Part I.C.1 regarding ALJ Rowell's bias-evidence which was produced via this
very process-the Social Security Administration still found ALJ Rowell to be unbiased.
125 Bias Procedures, supra note 119, at 49,187.
126
Id. (emphasis added).
127 The Social Security Administration's action (more appropriately, inaction) since
issuing these "interim" procedures lends credence to this notion. See Pronti v. Barnhart,
339 F. Supp. 2d 480, 499 (W.D.N.Y. 2004) (
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First, the procedure does nothing to alleviate the strict sixty-day
time constraint within which a claim of general bias must be filed. 128
If it is unrealistic to expect that a claimant or his lawyer will discover
an ALJ's general bias before the administrative hearing,129 it is not
much more plausible to believe that another sixty days will suffice.
Again, the claimant or his attorney must review tens (if not hundreds)
of cases in order to discover general bias.130 The procedure, thus,
does nothing to relieve the timing problem.
Second, the procedure does not at all clarify the means by which
a claimant is to present evidence supporting a claim of general bias.
There is no provision abrogating the requirement that the evidence
be "material."13 1 Furthermore, it is far from certain that the Social
Security Administration wishes the claimant to provide any evidence at
all. The procedure provides only for an "investigation" by the Office
of Hearings and Appeals and "notification" to the claimant and his
representative of the decision reached. 132 It mentions nothing about

[T] he Interim Procedures for investigating and hearing plaintiff's claims of
general bias may not provide a meaningful or adequate vehicle to demonstrate general bias. It cannot be overlooked that the Interim Procedures,
initially passed in 1992, were supposed to be finalized within six months of
their publication. Twelve years later that has yet to occur. Therefore, the
Social Security Administration still has no final regulation that applies to
claims of general bias.
). Such a claim is even further supported by the lack of seriousness with which the Administration has handled the bias claims against ALJ Russell. As of September 2004, the investigation had consisted of interviews with attorneys and other representatives who had
practiced before ALJ Russell, the Administration's Hearing Office Chief Administrative
Law Judge, the Hearing Office Director and Hearing Office staff, as well as ALJ Russell
himself. These interviews apparently were informal in nature-no transcript, tape recording, detailed notes, or a formal record of any kind having been taken. See id. at 498. "[A]
random sample of 42 cases, including decisions and hearing tapes, as well as 'many of the
cases cited by attorneys as problematic'" had also been reviewed. Id. at 498 (quoting a
memorandum from ALJ David Nisnewitz, Office of Hearings and Appeals, attached to a
September 2, 2004 letter to the court from U.S. Attorney Christopher Taffe). The district
court "remind[ed] the Commissioner [of Social Security] that a full record must be developed on this issue [of general bias] ....A full and adequate record must be assembled for
this Court to adequately review the issue when the cases are returned here." Id.
See Bias Procedures, supra note 119, at 49,187 (providing that the complaint must
128
be filed "before the expiration of the time for filing a request for review by the Appeals
Council"-sixty days, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.968(a) (1) (2004)).
129 See supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
130
To gather the evidence against ALJ Rowell in the Grant case, the Social Security
Administration examined no fewer than 212 of ALJ Rowell's decisions. See Grant v.
Comm'r, 111 F. Supp. 2d 556, 558 (M.D. Pa. 2000). The affidavits submitted in the Pronti
case present statistics based on at least 190 of ALJ Russell's decisions and well over 200
decisions of other ALJs. See Rothstein Letter, supra note 84; Thomas Aff., supra note 79,
3-11.
14-22; Vig Aff., supra note 79,
131
20 C.F.R. § 404.976(b)(1) (2004); see supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
1-2
See Bias Procedures, supra note 119, at 49,187.
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any presentation (evidentiary or otherwise) or any other type of direct
1 33
involvement by the claimant.
Finally, despite appearing to combine a bias complaint with an
appeal of the ALJ's decision,'3 the actual language of the procedure
conflicts with any such notion. Immediately after supposedly creating
a process to review alleged bias, the rule then provides that the claimant will merely be "informed" of the results of the bias review "regard1 35
less of the final decision on the merits of the claim for benefits."
Such language indicates that the bias decision is not "part of' the review of the ALJ decision; indeed, the bias review seems secondary toif not wholly separate from-the decision on the claim. When viewed
in this manner, the procedure not only is inadequate as an intraagency solution, but also further exacerbates the already inadequate
review process by precluding further review in federal court.1 36
C.

Federal Court Review

As anyone familiar with administrative law understands, one
would do well to win at the agency level; chances of a reversal in federal court are slim given the standard of review. 13 7 Combining this
deferential standard of review with the interpretations courts have actually given the Social Security disability statute paints a very stark picture for victims of ALJ general bias. The statute provides that "[t] he
court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of
the record, ajudgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision
of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding
the cause for a rehearing." 138 Courts have interpreted this language
as strictly limiting review to the agency-compiled record filed with the
court. 139 The district court may not conduct its own discovery to bol133

See id.

13,4

See id. ("[T]he allegations will be reviewed as part of the request for review

135

Id.

.

.

136
Despite its concerns about the inadequacy of the "interim" procedures, see supra
note 127, the court in Prontiremanded the case to the Social Security Administration pursuant to § 405(g) for further fact finding on the issue of bias, see Pronti v. Barnhart, 339 F.
Supp. 2d 480, 501 (W.D.N.Y. 2004). The court, however, refused at that time to endorse
the procedures. Id. at 498 ("This Court cannot now determine whether [the "interim"
procedures] provide an adequate record for review; that remains to be determined.").
Furthermore, it is not at all clear that the conclusions the Social Security Administration
reaches as the result of its "interim" procedures are reviewable by a federal court. See infra
notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
137
See also supra note 38 (describing the "substantial evidence" standard of review in
the federal courts). See generallyChevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (stating that where a "statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute").
138
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2000).
139
SeeJohnson v. Heckler, 741 F.2d 948, 952 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Judicial Review of the
A trial
administrative law judge's decision is limited to an evaluation of that decision ....
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ster the record with facts sufficient to support a claimant's allegation
of general bias.1411
The statute, however, does provide that "[t]he court ... may at
any time order additional evidence to be taken before the Commissioner of Social Security, but only upon a showing that there is new
evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure
to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding."'14 1 This language seems to permit limited discovery in the district
court so that a "showing" might be made and the case remanded to
the Commissioner for full investigation.
Indeed, in Hummel v. Heckler,'42 the Third Circuit permitted discovery where the plaintiff alleged that the Social Security Administration's "Bellmon Review" program put undue pressure on ALJs to
disapprove applications. 143 The district court in Grant viewed Hummel
as sufficient basis to proceed with its own discovery,1 44 but the Third
Circuit reversed, distinguishing the discovery approved in Hummel: "In
Hummel, we held that a claimant was entitled to discovery as to
whether the ALJ had undergone a 'Bellmon Review' and, if so, the
nature of the review. We did not sanction depositions of the ALJ's coworkers and staff.' 45 Thus, it appears that although Hummel-type review is permissible under section 405(g), Grant-type review is not.
de novo is improper."); Parker v. Harris, 626 F.2d 225, 231 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that if the
agency "has applied proper legal principles, judicial review is limited to an assessment of
whether the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence").
Although the Third Circuit's reasoning was ultimately statutorily based, in revers14o
ing the district court in Grant, it also opined that the "[a]vailability of the type of discovery
and trial that the plaintiffs sought in [that] case would undermine [the] vital indepen[W]e are convinced that such fact-finding would have a deleterious
dence [of ALJs) ....
effect on the independence of ALJs and thus on the administrative process." Grant v.
Shalala, 989 F.2d 1332, 1344 (3d Cir. 1993). The court continued, saying that "[i]t has
long been recognized that attempts to probe the thought and decision making process of
judges and administrators are generally improper." Id. (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) and United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422
(1941)). Although the amount of deference afforded to ALJs appears to be well-settled in
the courts, whether so much deference should be afforded them-as a matter of policy-is
nevertheless debatable. See Golin, supra note 25, at 1534-44.
'4'
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2000) (emphasis added).
736 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1984).
142
149 Id. at 94-95. A "Bellmon Review" was a review conducted under section 304(g) of
Pub. L. 96-365, and is named after the Senator who introduced the amendment. Id. at 94
ni.1; see Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-265, § 304(g), 94
Stat. 441, 456 (1980) ("The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall implement a
program of reviewing, on his own motion, decisions rendered by administrative lawjudges
as a result of hearings under section 221 (d) of the Social Security Act .... and shall report
to the Congress . . . on his progress."). For a somewhat more complete description, see
infra Conclusion.
144
Grant v. Sullivan, 720 F. Supp. 462, 467-68 (M.D. Pa. 1989).
145

Grant v. Shalala, 989 F. 2d 1332, 1344-45 & n.17 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).
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This distinction may be artificial, but it is the law in at least one
circuit and effectively precludes the type of evidence needed to prove
an ALJ's general bias. The most convincing evidence in the Grant case
came from depositions and testimony given by two of ALJ Rowell's coworkersI 46-evidence that the Third Circuit ruled prohibited. In addition, without supplemental discovery it would be impossible to uncover evidence from other cases, such as the statistical evidence
47
submitted in Pronti.1
Even if one were somehow to overcome this tremendous hurdle,
there is another statutory restriction the Third Circuit did not address
in Grant. Recall that under the statute, in order for a district court to
order the collection of additional evidence, there must be a showing
that such evidence would be "material" and that there was "good
cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a
prior proceeding."1 48 This presents the same problem that has been
encountered all along the way: according to the regulations, general
bias is not a reason for removing an ALJ from a case. 149 Consequently, evidence of such bias is irrelevant to any issue in a Social Security disability case and is, afortiori,both immaterial and absent from
the record for "good cause."
Perhaps the only obstacle that does not persist at the federal
court level is the lack of time to discover (in the lay sense) an ALJ's
general bias.' 50 Due to the enormous backlog of cases at the Appeals
Council, a claimant and his representative have ample time to learn of
an ALJ's general bias before ultimately appealing to federal court. Average processing time for a review request from the Appeals Council is
over 500 days' 5 1 and increasing rapidly; in the six years between 1994
and 2000, the processing time more than quadrupled. 152 The situation is now such that the rate of requests for review exceeds the rate of
disposal of such requests. 153 Though bleak from an administrative
standpoint, the enormous backlog provides claimants with the opportunity to investigate and discover any wrongs potentially suffered at
their initial ALJ hearing. Unfortunately, as explained above, such
knowledge is ultimately useless.
See supra Part I.C.1.
See Miller v. Poretsky, 595 F.2d 780, 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (RobinsonJ. concurring)
("Absent something amounting well nigh to an open admission of discriminatory purpose,
victims may find it virtually impossible to prove that fact unless permitted to introduce
evidence that the defendant has engaged in one or more acts of discrimination against
others."); supra Part4 I.C.2.
0
148
42 U.S.C. § 5(g) (2000).
149
See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
150 See supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
151
SOCALL SECURrY ArDiSORY BOARD, supra note 1, chart 60.
146
147

152
153

Id.
Id.
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Nevertheless, some plaintiffs have achieved success in federal
court despite the courts' apparent lack of authority to act. For instance, the plaintiff in Granteventually obtained a ruling that the Social Security Administration Appeals Council's finding that ALJ Rowell
was not biased was not supported by substantial evidence. 154 The district court ruling followed the conclusion of the processes established
in 57 Fed. Reg. 49,186155 and simply reviewed the Administration's
bias decision as if it were just another disability determination. 156
Future plaintiffs should not be exuberant, however. Although
the Social Security statute does provide that "[a] ny individual, after
any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a
hearing to which he was a party... may obtain a review of such decision
by a civil action,"'1 57 recall that 57 Fed. Reg. 49,186 is deliberate in its
characterization of the role of the claimant in the process. The claimant is merely to be "notified" of the progress of the Social Security
Administration's investigation; nowhere does the procedure make the
claimant a party to the investigation in any formal sense. 158 By carefully avoiding the creation of party status for the claimant, 57 Fed.
Reg. 49,186 makes judicial review of the conclusions reached by the
Social Security Administration extremely tenuous. Indeed, during
oral arguments on the cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings in
the Pronti case, the Assistant U.S. Attorney representing the Social Security Administration suspiciously evaded direcdy answering questions
on whether the court had jurisdiction to review decisions from the
investigation underway in that case.' 5 9 The Social Security Administration thus appears ready to contest the basis of the ruling in the
Grant case. And despite the unsatisfying place in which it leaves a
claimant, the Administration is likely correct in its current interpretation of the statute.
D.

Class Actions

Class action suits are the most common method of attacking ALJ
general bias.1 60 Initially it was unclear whether class action suits could
Grant v. Comm'r, 111 F. Supp. 2d 556, 570 (M.D. Pa. 2000).
See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
156
See Grant v. Comm'r, 111 F. Supp 2d at 565-70.
157
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2000) (emphasis added).
158
See Bias Procedures, supra note 119, at 49,187; supra Part II.B.2.
159 See Christopher Taffe, Asst. U.S. Att'y, Oral Arguments on Cross-Motions forJudgment on the Pleadings (Aug. 2003), Pronti v. Barnhart, 339 F. Supp. 2d 480 (W.D.N.Y.
2004) (No. 02-6309L(F)) (transcript on file with Court Reporter to Judge David G. Larimer, United States District Court for the Western District of New York) (oral arguments
attended by author).
160 See, e.g., Small v. Sullivan, 820 F. Supp. 1098 (S.D. Ill.
1992); Kendrick v. Sullivan,
784 F. Supp. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Grant v. Sullivan, 720 F. Supp. 462 (M.D. Pa. 1989). The
Pronti suit might have been brought as a class action except for the fact that Pronti was
154

155
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even be brought in the Social Security context; there are compelling
statutory arguments supporting the contention that 42 U.S.C.
§ 4 0 5(g) does not authorize class action lawsuits. First, the statute authorizes suit by "[a] ny individual" for judicial review of "any final decision.., to which [the plaintiff] was a party. ' 161 And, upon review, the
court can "enter... ajudgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. 'u t9 This language
suggests provision for only individual suits and individual decisions.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has ruled that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure permit class action suits in all civil actions 163-which
includes, by definition, Social Security disability appeals 164-and there
is nothing explicit in the Social Security statute suggesting otherwise.
Despite the availability by Supreme Court interpretation, class actions are likely not the end-all to ALJ general bias. As the Third Circuit made clear in Grant, a Social Security disability appeal simply
brought as a class action is not released from the substantive evidentiary restrictions of the statute; namely, the district court is bound to
an examination of the records produced at the administrative
16 5
hearings.
Bringing a class action suit in a general bias case is not without
benefits, however. Class actions place evidence from multiple cases
before the district court-exactly the broad type of evidence needed
for the court to reverse or remand an ALJ's decision on the ground of
general bias. 166 By uniting many claimants' cases, the district court
may, within the statutory limits, collectively consider the facts of each
case. If but one piece of evidence in the record of each case tended to
show an ALJ's general bias, a class action could conceivably cull

represented by the federal Legal Services Corporation, which under federal law is prohibited from bringing class action lawsuits. See Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2996e(d) (5) et seq.4 0(2000);
45 C.F.R. § 1617.3 (2004).
161
42 U.S.C. § 5 (g) (2000).
162

Id.

See FED. R. Cirv. P. 23; Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 699-700 (1979); see also
R. Civ. P. 1 (providing that the rules "govern the procedure in the United States
district courts in all suits of a civil nature" (emphasis added)).
164
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2000) ("Any individual . .. may obtain a review of [an ALJ's
decision] by a civil action . .. ").
165 See Grant v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 1332, 1339-44 (3d Cir. 1993); supra notes 38-40 and
accompanying text.
166 See Miller v. Poretsky, 595 F.2d 780, 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Robinson,J, concurring)
("Absent something amounting well nigh to an open admission of discriminatory purpose,
victims may find it virtually impossible to prove that fact unless permitted to introduce
evidence that the defendant has engaged in one or more acts of discrimination against
others."); supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
163

FED.
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enough evidence to persuade a district court that an ALJ was generally
biased. 167
Even with the fodder additional cases may provide, however, the
task of proving general bias remains formidable-especially when the
administrative record is unlikely to contain evidence of the type necessary. For instance, the most damaging evidence in Grant was the testimony from ALJ.Rowell's co-workers, 168 yet the Third Circuit roundly
condemned the use of such depositions to "probe the mind of an
1 69
Ultimately, the district court was only able to obtain that eviALJ."'
dence through reference to the Social Security Administration's record of investigation) 7 0 And it is unclear whether the Administration
1 71
will permit such use in the future.
Likewise, the most persuasive evidence in Pronti is the exceptionally disparate approval rates of ALJ Russell. 172 In order to determine
such rates, however, the calculation requires the inclusion of those
cases both denied and approved. Additionally, the national or regional rate of denial-which is necessary for comparison purposescannot be part of any claimant's administrative record because such
information is not "material."' i7 3 Furthermore, if one wished to conduct the statistical analysis necessary to correlate denials with variables
such as economic class (or any other group which may be the subject
of an ALJ's general bias), one would need to include approved cases as
well as those denied. Claimants who were awarded benefits would certainly not (and indeed could not) appeal their cases. Because such
claimants would not be members of the class, their records would not
be available to the court.
III
UNEXPLORED RELIEF: THINKING OUTSIDE 405(G)

Given the inadequacy of the conventional and near-conventional
methods available to address an ALJ's general bias, claimants may be
forced to contemplate unorthodox and perhaps untested methods.
This Part presents two possible solutions-two causes of action independent of the Social Security statute and regulations.' 74 By bringing
167

This at least partly took place in Grant. Recall the numerous references to many

separatedecisions of ALJ Rowell in which he labeled claimants as "prevaricators," "malingerers," and as having "no-work lifestyles." See supra Part I.C.1.
168 See supra notes 53-63 and accompanying text.
169 Grant v. Shalala,989 F.2d at 1344-45.
170
See Grant v. Comm'r, 111 F. Supp. 2d 556, 558-64 (M.D. Pa. 2000).
171
See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
172
See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
173
See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
174 Potential remedies via the Merit Systems Protection Board, which has the power to
discipline ALJs, are outside the scope of this Note. Only an agency can initiate a proceed-
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these actions, a claimant theoretically would be freed from the statutorily imposed evidentiary restrictions normally present in a Social Security disability claim appeal. This Part only begins the exploration
necessary to evaluate the efficacy of these causes of action in the Social
Security context. Whether courts will agree with their viability remains to be seen.
A.

Bivens Action

Because ALJ general bias is a violation of due process, basing a
cause of action directly on the Constitution is an appealing solution.
Social Security ALJs are not state officials, however, so the traditional
175
42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action is not available against them.
There appear to be no further statutory causes of action that can encompass claims of general bias against ALJs.1 76 Nevertheless, since
Bell v. Hood,1 7 7 the Supreme Court has recognized that a cause of ac178
tion against federal officials could rest directly on the Constitution.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the FederalBureau of Narcotics extended the holding to include an action for money damages. 179 Both
cases considered only Fourth Amendment violations (illegal searches)
by federal agents, but the principle was extended in Davis v. Passman' 80 to include violations of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. A Bivens action is brought against a federal officer in his individual capacity for damages caused by the unconstitutional actions of
that officer. 8 1 Applying Bivens actions in the Social Security context,
though, is not a matter of simply following precedent.
ing at the board; individual claimants have no formal role in the process. See Golin, supra
note 25, at 1555-57.
75
See Sheila M. Lombardi, Comment, Media in the Spotlight: Private Parties Liable for
Violating the Fourth Amendment, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 393, 394 n.6 (2000) (stating
that "Bivens applies to federal actors, whereas 42 U.S.C. § 1983 applies to state actors").
176
The Federal Tort Claims Act created the most widely known statutory cause of action providing for monetary relief. See ERWIN CHERMERINSKY, FEDERALJURISDICTION § 9.2.3,
at 616-30 (4th ed. 2003). Intentional torts, however, are not covered, id. at 619-20, and
biased adjudication would certainly qualify as an intentional tort. Another statutory cause
of action is contained in the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000). Section
702 provides that: "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action ... is entitled
to judicial review thereof." Id. Unlike Bivens actions, however, this cause of action is for
"relief other than money damages." Id.
177 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
178 The Supreme Court hinted at the reality of an implied cause of action in Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The Court, however, did not acknowledge what it had actually
done in Ex parte Young until Bell v. Hood. See 327 U.S. at 682-83.
179 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
180 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
181

See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389. Therefore, a successful Bivens action in the Social Secur-

ity context would not result in the claimant receiving regular benefits. Instead, the claimant would recover a one-time damage award (presumably equivalent to those benefits
wrongly withheld up to that point).
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Because Bivens actions are Supreme Court-created causes of action, they are subject to whatever restrictions the Court places on
them, and the Court has subsequently indicated that the holding in
Bivens was narrow.1 32 The Court has refused to extend Bivens to First
Amendment violations arising in the context of federal employment' 83 or to actions by military personnel injured by the unconstitutional actions of their superior officers.' 84 Additionally, in Schweiker v.
Chilicky--a case that should give pause to Social Security bias victimsthe Supreme Court declined to apply the logic of Bivens to Social Security disability claimants who alleged that their due process rights
1 85
had been violated.
The facts of Schweiker are distinguishable, however. Schweiker involved the procedure used by the Social Security Administration to
review the propriety of previously-awarded disability benefits. After
Congress recognized that "benefits were too often being improperly
terminated by state agencies, only to be reinstated by a federal
[ALJ],"' 86 it enacted emergency legislation providing that a Social Security disability benefits recipient could not have his benefits immediately terminated simply upon a state agency's determination that he
was no longer eligible.'8 7 Instead, payments would continue until an
ALJ reviewed the case and approved the termination. 188 The claimants in Schweikerwere unfortunately "caught in the middle" of the reform, their benefits having been terminated without the protection of
Congress's new process.1 89
The Supreme Court, again expressing its reservation to "extend"
Bivens "into new contexts," refused to grant relief to the claimants. 90
The Court rested its decision on its finding that Congress had already
acted to correct the problems of the benefits review process. 19' Because Congress is "competen [tJ at 'balancing governmental efficiency
and the rights of [individuals,]"' the Court refused to extend the applicable context of Bivens actions.' 92 The Court concluded that reSee
See
See
See

Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66-67 (2001).
Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
184
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
185
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 420-23 (1988).
186 Id. at 415.
187
See id.
188
Id.; see Pub. L. 97-455, § 2, 96 Stat. 2498 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
189 See Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 429.
190 Id. at 421, 429.
191
See id. at 423 ("When the design of a Government program suggests that Congress
has provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations
that may occur in the course of its administration, we have not created additional Bivens
remedies.").
192 Id. at 425 (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 389 (1983) (second alteration in
original)).
182

183
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gardless of its opinion of the adequacy of the remedy provided,
"Congress is the body charged with making the inevitable compromises required in the design of a massive and complex welfare
benefits program." 9
Although Congress had acted to correct the constitutional inadequacies of the process in Schweiker, it has not done so in the context of
ALJ general bias. Nothing in the current statute indicates that Congress has noted or attempted to correct the problem. Indeed, the bias
regulation conspicuously omits any reference to general bias and instead deals only with specific biases, such as monetary and personal
interest.' 94 Thus, the circumstances under which the Schweiker Court
refused to extend Bivens are not applicable to general bias cases like
Grant and Pronti. Therefore, under the Supreme Court's own reasoning, Bivens justifiably could be extended. And it would be a small exapplies to violations of Fifth
tension at that-Bivens already
19 5
Process.
Due
Amendment
If one could convince a court to recognize a Bivens action for ALJ
general bias claims, however, there would be an additional hurdle to
clear. The Social Security statute removes federal question jurisdiction from the courts for cases "arising under" Title 42.196 This
presents a problem beyond finding a cause of action for a claim of
general bias. 'Jurisdiction" and "cause of action" are two separate
197
questions, and both are required for a court to adjudicate a claim.
If Bivens only provides a claimant with a cause of action-notjurisdiction-then this "solution" to a Social Security claimant's conundrum
would be fleeting. Indeed, in Davis, the Court appeared to address
the need for both jurisdiction and a cause of action by noting-before
creating a Bivens-type cause of action for Fifth Amendment viola193

Id. at 429.

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.940, 416.1440 (2004).
See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
196 See 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (2000); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) ("The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States.").
194
195

197
See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b); CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 1350 (1999) (

Nor, as many courts have noted, should a motion under Rule 12(b)(1) be
confused with a motion under Rule 12(b) (6) to dismiss for failure to state a
claim for relief under federal or state law because the two are analytically
different; as many courts have observed, the former determines whether
the plaintiff has a right to be in the particular court and the latter is an
adjudication as to whether a cognizable legal claim has been stated.
see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) ("It is firmly established in our cases that the absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action does
not implicate subject-matterjurisdiction, i.e., the courts' statutory or constitutional power to
adjudicate the case.").
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tions-that "the District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (a) to consider petitioner's claim."' 98
Given the withdrawal of federal question (§ 1331) jurisdiction by
42 U.S.C. § 405(h), such a distinction raises serious doubt about the
viability of a Bivens action in the Social Security context.' 99 Nevertheless, there may be hope for the beleaguered bias victim. The Davis
Court did imply that any distinction between "cause of action" and
'Jurisdiction" is without difference in the context of a constitutional
violation. 2 0° Bringing out the heady language of Marbury v.Madison,
the Court quoted: "'The very essence of civil liberty' . . . 'certainly
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the
laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection.' "201 The Court then returned to Bell
v. Hood, stating that "'it is established practice for this Court to sustain
the jurisdiction of federal courts to issue injunctions to protect rights
safeguarded by the Constitution and to restrain individual state officers from doing what the 14th Amendment forbids the State to
do.'"202 It thus appears that the Supreme Court sees no meaningful
distinction between 'jurisdiction" and "cause of action" in the context
of a constitutional violation. Therefore, removal of federal question
jurisdiction by 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) appears to be of no consequence
20 3
here.
Even if the Supreme Court determined, however, that Bivens provides merely a cause of action (and that a separate jurisdictional grant
is needed), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 still should be sufficient to grant a court
jurisdiction, despite the language in 42 U.S.C. § 405(h). Because federal courts are loathe to accept that Congress has removed jurisdiction to hear claims (especially constitutional claims), there is a well20 4
established presumption against restrictions on court reviewability.
198
Davis, 442 U.S. at 236. The Court cited Bell v. Hood for this proposition, indicating
that although the principle of the case provides a cause of action, it does not conferjurisdiction. Id. at 242.
199
The Supreme Court has already held that, whatever causes of action the Administrative Procedure Act may provide, it does not create subject matter jurisdiction for Social
Security-related causes of action. Callifano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 107-08 (1977).
200

Davis, 442 U.S. at 236-44.

Id. at 242 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)).
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
203
SeeJAcK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CML PROCEDURE § 2.4 n.18 (3d ed. 1999) (stating
that, in Bivens, federal jurisdiction existed because the plaintiffs constitutional claim was
substantial). The issue of Congress's ability to withdraw federal jurisdiction of constitutional claims is one of the most debated in all of American law. For an overview of the
debate, see RicHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 342-45 & nn. 19-25 (5th ed. 2003). This Note obviously takes the not
uncontroversial view that individuals must be able to bring, their constitutional claims
somewhere.
204
See Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349 (1984).
201

202
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For instance, in Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, the
Court ruled that "clear and convincing" evidence is required "to overcome the 'strong presumption that Congress did not mean to prohibit
all judicial review,"' thus preserving the courts' ability to review consti205
tutional challenges to the administration of the Medicare statute.
In line with such a restrictive presumption, the "arising under" language must be read narrowly in jurisdictional restrictions. A constitutional claim does not "arise under" a statute at all; rather it "arises
under" the Constitution and is thus not barred by a statutory jurisdictional restriction. And though Bowen was technically a Medicare case,
it dealt with the exact same Social Security jurisdiction statute relevant
to disability claims. 206 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has held, and the
Supreme Court did not disagree, that the jurisdictional bar of
§ 405(h) is of no consequence when adjudicating constitutional
20 7

claims in the Social Security context.

Interestingly, victims of ALJ general bias may have been unwittingly pleading Bivens-type causes of action for some time. Claimants
in Small, Kendrick, Grant, and Pronti all pleaded their cause of action
not only on the usual 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) substantial evidence ground,
20 8
but also on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Oddly enough, none of these cases squarely confronted the Bivens issue-the opinions addressed only those aspects relating to the Social
Security Act.20 9 Although the plaintiffs failed to indicate clearly their
476 U.S. 667, 681 (1986) (quoting Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 (1975)).
42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (2000). This statute is incorporated into the Medicare statute
only by reference. See id. § 1395.
207
See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 419 (1988); cf Lowry v. Apfel, No. CV-991210-ST, 2000 WL 730412, at *8-11 (D. Or. June 7, 2000) (holding that a lawyer is not
precluded by 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) from bringing his own constitutional claim in connection
with a Social Security disability case).
208
See Small v. Sullivan, 820 F. Supp. 1098, 1103 (S.D. Ill. 1992) ("The plaintiffs seek a
declaratory judgment that ALJ Ritter is biased against disability claimants generally and
that such bias has deprived them of their right to fair hearings before an impartial judge in
violation of ... the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution."); Kendrick v. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. 94, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("Plaintiffs claim
that ALJ Anyel's bias and refusal to apply applicable law deprives claimants of fair hearings
on their claims, in violation of the Social Security Act and the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution."); Grant v. Sullivan, 720 F. Supp. 462,
463-64 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (
The Plaintiffs-claimants assert in this case, as others have in the past, that
because of ALJ Rowell's bias, they have been and will be denied fair Social
Security disability claim hearings in violation of the Social Security Act and
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
); ProntiAm. Compl., supra note 75, 36 ("The defendant Commissioner has not provided
a fair forum in ALJ Franklin T. Russell['s courtroom] for the claimant to receive a fair
hearing . . . in violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment of the
205

206

Constitution ....").

209 To be fair, the court in Pronti did touch on the issue. The Pronti decision noted
that the plaintiff had asserted § 1331 federal question jurisdiction in the course of pleading
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desire to pursue a Bivens action, given the liberal manner in which
pleadings are to be read, such poor pleading alone should not prevent the court from addressing a claim founded directly on the Fifth
21 0
Amendment.
With a valid cause of action separate from the Social Security Act
and regulations, claimants would be free to discover and present evidence relevant to their 'claim-namely, evidence of general bias in
their case and others. Claimants would no longer be bound to the
administrative record because the cause of action would not be subject to the restrictions placed on claims arising under the Social Security Act. Thus, a Bivens action could be a viable means to redress ALJ
general bias.
B.

Writ of Mandamus

Another possible remedy for Social Security disability claimants
who have been victims of ALJ general bias is a writ of mandamus. The
writ is normally issued to compel an official to perform a duty which
he refuses otherwise to perform. 211 ChiefJustice Taft in Work v. United
States ex rel. Rives wrote that
[m]andamus issues to compel an officer to perform a purely ministerial duty. It cannot be used to compel or control a duty in the
discharge of which by law he is given discretion. The duty may be
discretionary within limits. He cannot transgress those limits, and if
he does so, he may be controlled by injuction or mandamus to keep
212
within them.
a due process violation. Pronti v. Barnhart, 339 F. Supp. 2d 480, 499 (W.D.N.Y. 2004).
The court, however, never discussed § 1331 (where Bivens necessarily would have been
raised), focusing instead on its potential mandamus jurisdiction. Id. at 499-500; see also
infra note 230 and accompanying text (discussing Prontfs statements regarding mandamus
relief).
210
See FED. R. Crv. P. 8 (a) (2) (requiring that a party set forth "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief"); Conley v. Gibson, 355

U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (
[T] he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out
in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all the
Rules require is "a short and plain statement of the claim" that will give the
defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.
see also FRIENDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 203, § 5.7 (describing the basic requirements of
notice pleading).
211
Louis L. JAFEt, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 176 (1965). Note
that, like a Bivens action, this remedy would not result in the awarding of regular Social
Security disability benefits. Rather, the claimant would receive a court ruling that an ALJ is
indeed biased-a big feat given the procedural problems previously explored in this
Note-and an order that the hearing be conducted absent such bias.
212
267 U.S. 175, 177 (1925).
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to obtain; the Supreme Court has labeled it
The remedy is difficult
"extraordinary." 213 It is "extraordinary" not only because the qualifications for obtaining the writ are so strenuous, but also because "in
the minds of some American judges[,] there have been difficulties in
coming to a coherent view of mandamus." 2 14 The primary source of
this difficulty may be the concern that mandamus is inconsistent with
the separation of powers doctrine. 21 5 Nevertheless, since Marbury v.
Madison2 16 the Supreme Court has acknowledged that a writ of mandamus is appropriate in certain circumstances. The usual requirements for a writ of mandamus include: (1) that the claim be clear and
certain; (2) that the officer's duty be ministerial and free of discretion; and (3) that no other remedy is available. 217 But "[e]ven if a
plaintiff fails to satisfy this three-part test, the court still has discretion
2 18
whether to grant mandamus relief.1
Applying these elements to the Social Security disability context
can yield somewhat promising results. First, a genuine claim that an
ALJ possessed a general bias would seem to be a clear violation "certain" to warrant remedy. The second requirement, that the officer
must have a clear, nondiscretionary duty to act,2 19 should also be fairly
easy to meet; it is beyond question that an ALJ has an explicit, nondiscretionary duty to conduct a fair and impartial hearing. 220 Usually,
however, courts add an additional test to this element: the officer
must presently be refusing to perform the duty in question. 221 Here,
claimants may face trouble. Most certainly, few ALJs will openly refuse
to give a claimant a fair hearing. The refusal requirement, however, is
only a prong of the mandamus test, not ajurisdictionalbar.Therefore,
a claimant would have the opportunity, after discovery, to prove the
Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 698 (1979); see also Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court for
213
the N. Dist. of Cal., 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976) ("The remedy of mandamus is a drastic one,
to be invoked only in extraordinary situations.").
JAFFE, supra note 211, at 178.
214
215 See id.
216
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
217
Lowry v. Apfel, No. CV-99-1210-ST, 2000 WL 730412, at *11 (D. Or. June 7, 2000)
(citing Fallini v. Hodel, 783 F.2d 1343, 1345 (9th Cir. 1986)); see also Heckler v. Ringer, 466
U.S. 602, 616 (1984) (stating that mandamus "is intended to provide a remedy for a plaintiff only if he has exhausted all other avenues of relief and only if the defendant owes him a
clear nondiscretionary duty"). Formulation of the elements for when the writ may issue
takes various forms. E.g., Lovallo v. Froehlke, 468 F.2d 340, 343 (2d Cir. 1972) ("(1) a clear
right in the plaintiff to the relief sought; (2) a plainly defined and peremptory duty on the
part of the defendant to do the act in question; and (3) no other adequate remedy
available.").
218
Lowr,, 2000 WL 730412, at *11; see also Kerr, 426 U.S. at 403 ("[1]t is important to
remember that issuance of the writ is in large part a matter of discretion with the court to
which the petition is addressed.").
219
See Ringer, 466 U.S. at 616.
See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
220
221
SeeJAF E, supra note 211, at 176.
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ALJ's recalcitrance and may be able to produce enough evidence to
raise a strong inference that an ALJ was affirmatively refusing to perform his duty.
The real battle, however, would be over the final criterion: a
22 2
claimant must have absolutely no other adequate avenue for relief.
The Social Security Administration would argue that claimants have
many available and adequate remedies for dealing with ALJ general
bias, including recusal, the Appeals Council, the procedure in 57 Fed.
Reg. 49,186, and federal court review. Such an argument, though,
should be easily dismissed given the review of those remedies in Part
II. Not only is there no adequate alternative remedy for such claimants, there appears to be no remedy at all. Only the procedure outlined in 57 Fed. Reg. 49,186 comes close to providing an avenue to
223
remedy bias, but it is nonetheless inadequate.
With mandamus thus appearing proper, the final questions are
jurisdictional ones. As originally enacted, the Social Security Act precluded judicial review pursuant to "section 24 of the Judicial Code of
the United States. ' 224 In 1948, those words were replaced with "section 1331 or 1346 of Title 28."225 But only later, in 1962, was mandamus first codified-in Title 28, section 1361.226 Thus, because § 1361
was codified after §§ 1331 and 1346 were specifically inserted in 42
U.S.C. § 405(h), there is some question as to whether the new language (which references only §§ 1331 and 1346, but not § 1361) was
meant to be only a more specific way of saying the same thing as the
previous language ("section 24 of the Judicial Code," which encompassed mandamus) or whether it was meant to restrict jurisdiction to
only those cases brought under §§ 1331 and 1346.
The Supreme Court has never ruled whether a writ of mandamus
can issue in the Social Security disability context. 227 The Third Circuit
Ringer, 466 U.S. at 616.
Albeit in a different context, the Loury court rejected the contention that the procedures in 57 Fed. Reg. 49,186 are sufficient to preclude mandamus relief. See 2000 UrL
730412, at *11-12.
224
See Elliot v. Weinberger, 564 F.2d 1219, 1227-28 & n.12 (9th Cir. 1977).
225
Act of June 25, 1948 to Revise, Codify, and Enact Into Law Title 28 of the United
States Code Entitled Judicial Code and Judiciary, Pub. L. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869.
226
Mandamus and Venue Act, Pub. L. No. 87-748, 76 Stat. 744 (1962); see Clark Byse &
Joseph V. Fiocca, Section 1361 of theMandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and "Nonstatuory"
Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 HARv. L. Rav. 308, 311-12 (1967).
227 See Ringer, 466 U.S. at 616 ("Assuming without deciding that the third sentence of
§ 405(h) does not foreclose mandamus jurisdiction in all Social Security cases . . .");
Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 698 (1999) ("[W]e do not reach the question whether
mandamus would otherwise be available."); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 n.12
(1976) ("Given our conclusion that jurisdiction in the District Court was proper under
§ 4 0 5 (g), we find it unnecessary to consider Eldrige's contention that notwithstanding
§ 405(h) there was jurisdiction over his claim under the mandamus statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1361 .... ").
222
223
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skirted the issue in Grant but did not foreclose it. 228 Some courts,
however, have explicitly held that mandamus jurisdiction indeed
lies. 229 In fact, the district court in Prontirecently implied that mandamus would be a proper remedy for biased ALJs. In sweeping dictum,
the clearly agitated court embraced mandamus as a potential means
for the court to address the bias of ALJ Russell:
The Court... is not constricted by § 405(h). The allegations of bias
are significant enough that, if they are not addressed adequately by
the Commissioner, this Court could proceed de novo to consider the
bias issue in connection with the alternative causes of action that
have been filed.
... Although I have opted to remand the issue of general bias
to the Commissioner, I could have done otherwise.
. . [I]t should be clear that plaintiffs may be entitled to have
their due process claims heard in the district court directly, espea full
cially if the Commissioner is unable or unwilling to conduct
230
and fair review of these most serious issues relating to bias.
*

This is the strongest endorsement of mandamus jurisdiction in the
Social Security disability context to date-even if dictum-and is the
first time it has been seriously threatened in response to the general
bias of an ALJ. Mandamus, therefore, seems ripe for exploration and
may fully be tested in the near future.
CONCLUSION

After delving headlong into the problems facing Social Security
disability claimants confronted with a generally biased ALJ, it warrants
a step back to realize the full implications of the solutions presented.
Effectively addressing the issue of ALJ general bias undoubtedly would
See Grant v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 1332, 1342 (3d Cir. 1993).
See Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489, 1507-08 (9th Cir. 1984), vacated on other
grounds, 496 U.S. 1082 (1984); Dietsch v. Schweiker, 700 F.2d 865, 868 (2d Cir. 1983);
Elliotv. Weinberger, 564 F.2d 1219, 1227-28 & n.12, modied sub nom. Califanov.Yamasaki,
442 U.S. 682 (1979); DeLao v. Califano, 560 F.2d 1384, 1388 (9th Cir. 1977); White v.
Matthews, 559 F.2d 852, 856 (2d Cir. 1977); Cockrum v. Califano, 475 F. Supp. 1222,
1230-31 (D.D.C. 1979) (dictum); Lyons v. Weinberger, 376 F. Supp. 248, 255 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
Even if § 1361 mandamus relief were held not to lie in the Social Security context
because of 42 U.S.C. § 402(h), the Administrative Procedure Act provides for bothjurisdiction and a cause of action for relief similar to mandamus. See Administrative Procedure
Act § 703, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (providing for relief "including actions
for declaratory judgments or writs of prohibitory or mandatory injunction"); Mathews, 424
U.S. at 332 n.12 ("Given our conclusion that jurisdiction in the District Court was proper
under § 4 05(g), we find it unnecessary to consider Eldrige's contention that notwithstanding § 405(h) there wasjurisdiction over his claim tinder... the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.").
Pronti v. Barnhart, 339 F. Supp. 2d 480, 499-500 (W.D.N.Y. 2004).
230
228
229
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require that ALJs be subject to greater scrutiny and higher objectivity
standards. But courts historically have been averse to scrutinizing the
23 1
internal decisionmaking of judges-even ALJs.
Indeed, courts have dealt with a similar issue in Social Security
Administration disability cases before. In the 1980s, the Social Security Administration undertook the "Bellmon Review" program to examine ALJs whose rate of approval was thought to be too high.2 3 2 At
least four courts passed on the legality of the program and generally
found it to be invalid. 233 The main concern was the program's impact
on the independence and impartiality of ALJs. 234 Using statistics to

"evaluate" ALJs was especially controversial. 23

5

The extreme nature of the biases demonstrated in Grant and
Prontiindicates that some oversight is in order. Unfairness to disability claimants by denying needed assistance surely carries more weight
than unfairness to ALJs by denying their ability to wield unacceptable
prejudice. Any valid concern that the solutions proposed in this Note
would negatively impair the independence and impartiality of ALJs
should be allayed by courts' institutional aversion to them. Finally,
231

See Grant v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 1332, 1345 (3d Cir. 1993) (

In short, it appears that the plaintiffs made very extensive eflorts to probe
the thinking and decision making process of an officer occupying a position described by the Supreme Court as "functionally comparable" to that
of a judge.
Such efforts to probe the mind of an ALJ, if allowed, would pose a
substantial threat to the administrative process. Every ALJ would work
under the threat of being subjected to such treatment if his or her pattern
of decisions displeased any administrative litigant or group with the resources to put together a suit charging bias. Every ALJ would know that his
or her staff members could be deposed and questioned in detail about the
ALJ's decision making and thought process, that co-workers could be subpoenaed and questioned about social conversations, that the ALJ's notes
and papers could be ordered produced in discovery, and that any evidence
gathered by these means could be used, in essence, to put the ALJ on trial
in district court to determine if he or she could be barred from performing
the core functions of his or her office. This would seriously interfere with
the ability of many ALJs to decide the cases that come before them based
solely on the evidence and the law.
(footnote omitted)).
232 See W.C. v. Heckler, 629 F. Supp. 791, 793-94 (W.D. Wash. 1985) (describing the
Bellmon Review Program); see also Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1376-79
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (same), vacated on other grounds, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986).
233
See Barry v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 1324, 1330-31 (9th Cir. 1987); Salling v. Bowen, 641 F.
Supp. 1046, 1055-56, 1073-74 (W.D. Va. 1986); Assoc. of Admin. LawJudges, Inc. v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1133-36, 1143 (D.D.C. 1984). But seeNash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675,
678-81 (2d Cir. 1989) (upholding the validity of the Bellmon Review Program only after
accepting the Secretary's claim that the program did not seek to "coerce ALJs into ...
deciding more cases against claimants").
234 See L. Hope O'Keeffe, Note, Administrative Law Judges, Performance Evaluation, and
Production Standards:Judicial Independence Versus Employee Accountability, 54 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 591, 617-18 (1986).
235 See id. at 605-06.
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the benefit of any remaining doubt should surely be placed with an
Article III federal judge or an individual claimant, not an Article I
23 6
ALJ.
This Note has shown that the current evidentiary allowances are
inadequate to address ALJ general bias. There are many conceivable
solutions. The Social Security Administration could promulgate regulations that would allow a claimant effectively to challenge a generally
biased ALJ. Alternatively, Congress could mandate that the Social Security Administration undertake the task-or even craft the procedures on its own. Additionally, courts could reinterpret the
evidentiary restrictions imposed by the statute so as to allow claimants
an easier method by which to address the problem. All of these possibilities are viable, but each requires action by parties other than
claimants. This Note has suggested two additional solutions that
plaintiffs could attempt under current doctrine: Bivens actions and
writs of mandamus. Until Congress or the Social Security Administration acts, plaintiffs can fare no worse by attempting either of these
solutions than they do under the current system.

236
The Supreme Court has held that ALJs were intended to be merely a "'special class
of semi-independent subordinate hearing officers,"' not on par with Article III federal
judges. Ramspeck v. Fed. Trial Examrs. Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 132 (1953) (citing Legislative History of the Administrative Procedure Act). As a starting point in the debate over
the proper deference afforded ALJs, see Richard B. Hoffman & Frank P. Cihlar, Judicial
Independence: Can It Be Without Article II1?, 46 MERCER L. REv. 863 (1995); Karen S. Lewis,
Administrative Law Judges and the Code ofJudicial Conduct: A Need for Regulated Ethics, 94 DICK.

L. REv. 929, 937-48 (1990).
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